State of Utah v. Larry G. Bohne : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2001
State of Utah v. Larry G. Bohne : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Mark L. Shurtleff; attorney general; Jeanne B. Inouye; assistant attorney general; Scott M. Burns;
Iron county attorney; attorneys for appellee.
J. Bryan Jackson; J. Bryan Jackson, PC; attorney for appellant. Weston J. White; Christopherson,
Farris PC; Attorney for Amicus.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Bohne, No. 20010116.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/1756
I N THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, Appellee and 
Respondent, 
vs. 
LARRY G.BOHNE, 
Defendant, Appellant < 
Petitioner. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT BOHNE 
Appeal from a Judgment, Sentence, Stay of Execution of Sentence, Order of 
Probation and Certificate of Probable Cause, filed August 3, 1998, by the Fifth 
Judicial District Court of Iron County, State of Utah, the honorable Robert T. 
Braithwaite, presiding. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
JEANNE B.INOUYE (1618) 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
(801)366-0180 
SCOTT M. BURNS (4283) 
IRON COUNTY ATTORNEY 
97 North Main, Suite #1 
Post Office Box 428 
Cedar City, Utah 84721-0428 
(435) 586-6694 
Attorneys for Appellee 
AUG 2 7 2001 
Case No. 20010116-SC 
Court Appellant. 20000350-CA 
Argument Priority: (15) 
J. BRYAN JACKSON, (4488) 
J. BRYAN JACKSON, P.C. 
157 East Center Street 
Post Office Box 519 
Cedar City, Utah 84721-0519 
(435) 586-8450 
Attorney for Appellant 
WESTON J. WHITE (3448) 
CHRISTOPHERSON, FARRIS, P.C. 
189 North Main Street 
Post Office Box 2408 
St. George, Utah 84771 
(435)634-1600 
Attorney for Amicus 
FILED 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
PAT BARTHOLOMEW 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
I N THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, Appellee and 
Respondent, 
vs. 
LARRY G.BOHNE, 
Defendant, Appellant and 
Petitioner. 
Case No. 20010116-SC 
Court Appellant. 20000350-CA 
Argument Priority: (15) 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT BOHNE 
Appeal from a Judgment, Sentence, Stay of Execution of Sentence, Order of 
Probation and Certificate of Probable Cause, filed August 3, 1998, by the Fifth 
Judicial District Court of Iron County, State of Utah, the honorable Robert T. 
Braithwaite, presiding. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
JEANNE B.INOUYE (1618) 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
(801)366-0180 
SCOTT M. BURNS (4283) 
IRON COUNTY ATTORNEY 
97 North Main, Suite #1 
Post Office Box 428 
Cedar City, Utah 84721-0428 
(435) 586-6694 
Attorneys for Appellee 
J. BRYAN JACKSON, (4488) 
J. BRYAN JACKSON, P.C. 
157 East Center Street 
Post Office Box 519 
Cedar City, Utah 84721-0519 
(435) 586-8450 
Attorney for Appellant 
WESTON J. WHITE (3448) 
CHRISTOPHERSON, FARRIS, P.C. 
189 North Main Street 
Post Office Box 2408 
St. George, Utah 84771 
(435)634-1600 
Attorney for Amicus 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
JURISDICTION 2 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 2 
ISSUE NO. 1 2 
ISSUE NO. 2 2 
ISSUE NO. 3 2 
ISSUE NO. 4 3 
ISSUE NO. 5 3 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 3 
STATUTORY PROVISION 5 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 6 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 8 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 12 
ARGUMENT 17 
POINT NO. 1 The decision of the Court of Appeals is in error, 
interpreting the personal property exemption to exclude off site 
builders and contractors 17 
POINT NO. 2 The concurring opinion of Judge Thorne is reasoned 
more consistently with the plain meaning of the statutory language 
but places the burden of proof upon the Defendant in the context 
of a criminal offense and therefore is in error 17 
/// 
/ / / 
POINT NO. 3 The decision of the Court of Appeals substantially 
changes the accepted understanding of the personal property 
exemption within the industry 23 
POINT NO. 4 The trial court erred in finding the Appellant guilty of 
the crime of contracting without a license, class A misdemeanor, 
in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-55-301 (1953, as amended) 
and not exempt from licensing under § 305 of the same Chapter 26 
POINT NO. 5 The trial court erred in its interpretation of Utah 
Code Annotated § 58-55-305(6) (1953, as amended), in excluding 
the Appellant from exemption as a person engaged in the sale or 
merchandising of personal property and therefore subject to the 
licensing requirements in the construction trades in the State of Utah. 29 
CONCLUSION 35 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 37 
ADDENDUM 38 
A. COPIES OF CHAPTER 78 AND 58 OF THE UTAH CODE. 
B. COURT'S JUDGEMENT, SENTENCE, STAY OF EXECUTION OF 
SENTENCE ORDER OF PROBATION AND CERTIFICATE OF 
PROBABLE CAUSE. 
C. COURT'S OPINION. 
/// 
/// 
/// 
/ / / 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Annotated, § 78-2-2(3)(a) (1953, as amended) 2,5 
Utah Code Annotated, § 58-55-305(6) (1953, as amended) 3,5,1314, 
16,17,18, 
19,31,34,35 
Utah Code Annotated, § 58-55-301 (1953, as amended) 2,5,13, 
18,20,26 
Utah Code Annotated, § 58-55-305 (1953, as amended) 27,34 
Utah Code Annotated, § 58-55-307 (1953, as amended) 18 
Utah Code Annotated, § 58-56-1 et seq. (1953, as amended) 5 
Utah Code Annotated, § 58-55-102(5) (1953, as amended) 5,28 
Utah Code Annotated, § 58-56-3(12) (1953, as amended) 5,28 
Utah Code Annotated, § 58-56-4 (1953, as amended) 5,21 
Utah Code Annotated, § 58-56-6 (1953, as amended) 5,25 
Utah Code Annotated, § 58-56-15(5) (1953, as amended) 5 
Utah Code Annotated, § 58-56-15 (1953, as amended) 25 
CASES 
Bevnon v. St. George - Dixie Lodge Number 1743 Benevolent & 
Protective Order of Elks. 854 P.2d 513, 518 (Utah 1993) 4 
Berrett v. Purser & Edwards. 876 P.2d 367, 370 (Utah 1994) . . . . 30 
Biddle v. Washington Terrace City. 993 P.2d 875 (Utah 1999) . . 20 
Bonham v. Morgan. 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989) 3 
CIG Exploration. Inc.. v. Utah State Tax Commission. 897 P.2d 
1214, 1216 (Utah 1995) 3,4 
Estelle v. Williams. 425 U.S. 501, 503 96 S. Ct. 1691,1692, 
48 L Ed.2d 126 (1976) 22 
John Wagner Assoc, v. Hercules Inc.. 797 P.2d 1123 
(Ut App. 1990) 19 
Kearns - Tribune Corp. v. Hornak. 917 P.2d 79 (Ut App. 1996).. 32 
Landes v. Capital City Bank. 795 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1990) 20 
Newspaper Agency v. Audit Div. Tax Com'n. 938 P.2d 266 
(Utah 1997) 20 
Osuaia v. Aetna Life & Casualty. 608 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1980). 4 
Salt Lake City Corp. v. Salt Lake Civ. Ser.. 908 P.2d 871 
(Ut App. 1995) 20 
Schurtz v. BMW of North America Inc.. 814 P.2d 1108,1112 
(Utah 1991) 4 
State v. Bishop. 753 P.2d 439,487 (Utah 1988) 22 
State v. Cox. 826 P.2d 656 (Ut App. 1992) 29 
State v. Crediford. 927 P.2d 1129,1133 (Wash. 1996) 22 
State v. Gerrard. 584 P.2d 885 (Utah 1978) 5 
State v. Gibbons 779 .2d 1133 (Utah 1989) 5 
State v.Larson. 865 P.2d 1355,1357 (Utah 1993) 4 
/// 
/// 
/// 
/// 
/// 
/// 
/// 
/// 
/// 
/// 
/// 
/// 
/// 
State v.Loveqren, 798 P.2d 767, 771 (Ut. App. 1990) 23 
State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991) 4 
State v.Rhodes. 818 P.2d 1048 (Ut App. 1991) 5 
State v. Windward. 907 P.2d 1188 (Ut App. 1995) 29 
Woodward v. Fazzio. 823 P.2d 474 (Ut App. 1991) 23 
World Peace Movement v. Newspaper Agency . 
879 P.2d 253, 259 (Utah 1994) 4,30 
Page 3 of 37 
IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
Plaintiff, Appellee and ) 
Respondent, : 
vs. : Case No. 20010116-SC 
LARRY G. BOHNE, : Court. Appellant. 20000350 CA 
Defendant, Appellant and: Argument Priority: (15) 
Petitioner. ) 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT BOHNE 
Appeal from a Judgment, Sentence, Stay of Execution of Sentence, Order 
of Probation and Certificate of Probable Cause, filed August 3,1998, by the Fifth 
Judicial District Court of Iron County, State of Utah, the honorable Robert T. 
Braithwaite, presiding. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
JEANNE B.INOUYE (1618) 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
(801)366-0180 
SCOTT M. BURNS 
IRON COUNTY ATTORNEY 
97 North Main, Suite #1 
Post Office Box 428 
Cedar City, Utah 84721-0428 
(435) 586-6694 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
J. BRYAN JACKSON, (4488) 
J. BRYAN JACKSON, P.C. 
157 East Center Street 
Post Office Box 519 
Cedar City, Utah 84721-0519 
(435) 586-8450 
Attorney for Appellant 
WESTON J. WHITE (3448) 
CHRISTOPHERSON, FARRIS, P.C. 
189 North Main Street 
Post Office Box 2408 
St. George, Utah 84771 
(435) 634-1600 
Attorney for Amicus 
Page 1 of 37 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-2-2 (3)(a)(1953, as amended), to review the opinion of the Court of 
Appeals filed January 11, 2001. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
ISSUE NO 1: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in its interpretation of 
Section 58-55-305 (6), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, in concluding that 
the exemption only applied to the sale or merchandising of personal property and 
excluded construction of modular homes off site. 
ISSUE NO. 2: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in its application of the 
legal presumption placing upon the Appellant in a criminal case the burden of 
producing sufficient evidence or facts to qualify for a statutory exemption to which 
the Appellant is entitled as a matter of right. 
ISSUE NO. 3: Whether the trial court erred in finding the Appellant guilty of the 
crime of contracting without a license, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code Annotated § 58-55-301 (1953, as amended), and not exempt from licensing 
under Section 305 of the same Chapter. 
/// 
/// 
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ISSUE NO. 4: Whether the trial court erred In its interpretation of Utah Code 
Annotated § 58-55-305 (6) ( 1953, as amended), excluding the Appellant from 
exemption as a person engaged in the sale or merchandising of personal property 
and therefore subject to the licensing requirements in the construction trades in the 
State of Utah. 
ISSUE NO. 5: Whether the trial court erred in its interpretation of the statutory 
authority for the regulation of the construction trades by including Appellant an off 
site modular home fabricator within the same regulatory scheme, requiring that 
Appellant be licensed as a contractor in the State of Utah when in engaged in the 
fabrication of off site modular housing. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Appellant believes that the central issues are of law and statutory 
interpretation and that the appropriate standard of review is one of correctness. The 
matter was presented to the trial court upon stipulated facts in summary judgment 
fashion. In as much as a challenge to summary judgment presents for review 
conclusions of law only, review of those conclusions is for correctness, without 
according deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. See Bonham v. Morgan, 
788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989). When faced with a question of statutory construction, the 
reviewing Court first looks to the plain language of the statute. CIG Exploration. Inc. 
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v. Utah State Tax Commission. 897 P.2d 1214,1216 (Utah 1995); see also State v. 
Larson. 865 P.2d 1355,1357 (Utah 1993); Schurtz v. BMW of North Amercia Inc.. 
814 P.2d 1108, 1112 (Utah 1991). Only if the Court finds some ambiguity need it 
look further. CIG Exploration. Inc.. 897 P.2d at 1216; See also Schurtz. 814 P.2d at 
1112; World Peace Movement v. Newspaper Agency. 879 P.2d 253, 259, (Utah 
1994). Only when the reviewing Court finds ambiguity in the statute's plain language 
need it seek guidance from the legislative history and relevant policy considerations. 
CIG Exploration. Inc.. 897 P.2d at 1216; See also Bevnon v. St. George - Dixie 
Lodge Number 1743. Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks. 854 P.2d 513, 518 
(Utah 1993). If doubt or uncertainty exists as to the meaning or application of an 
Act's provisions, the Court should analyze the Act in its entirety and harmonize its 
provisions in accordance with the legislative intent and purpose. CIG Exploration. 
Inc.. 897 P.2d at 1216; see also Osuala v. Aetna Life & Casualty. 608 P.2d 242,243 
(Utah 1980). However, this matter also involved the taking of testimony and the trial 
court also made as part of its Judgment, Sentence, Stay of Execution of Sentence 
and Probation and Certificate of Probable Cause certain findings and conclusions 
and with regard to the same Appellant asserts that as they concern questions of law 
the standard of review is one of "correctness" and as they concern questions of fact, 
the standard of review is one of "clearly erroneous." See State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 
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774(Utah 1991) and State v. Rhodes. 818 P.2d 1048 (Ut App. 1991); See also State 
v. Gibbons. 779 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1989); and State v. Gerrard. 584 P.2d 885 (Utah 
1978). 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The statutory provisions which Appellant believes to be applicable are as 
follows: 
1. Utah Code Annotated §78-2-2 (3)(a) (1953, as amended). 
2. Utah Code Annotated § 58-55-301 (1953, as amended). 
3. Utah Code Annotated § 58-55-305 (6) (1953, as amended). 
4. Utah Code Annotated § 58-56-1 et seq. (1953, as amended). 
5. Utah Code Annotated § 58-55-102 (5) (1953, as amended). 
6. Utah Code Annotated § 58-56-3 (12) (1953, as amended). 
7. Utah Code Annotated § 58-56-4 (1953, as amended). 
8. Utah Code Annotated § 58-56-6 (1953, as amended). 
9. Utah Code Annotated § 58-56-15 (5) (1953, as amended). 
The full text of the statutory provisions are attached hereto at Addendum A to 
the appendix. 
/// 
/// 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE: This action concerns the Appellant, LARRY G. 
BOHNE, who has been involved in the prefabrication of homes since the early 
1970's. The homes are assembled off site at Appellant's plant or yard and then 
transported to the construction site and delivered to the customer. The customer is 
typically a general contractor although occasionally the product is sold to a home 
owner who demonstrates sufficient experience in the construction field. The 
Appellant has held a general contractor's license in the past but chose not to renew 
the same when he went into the business of off site prefabrication exclusively. The 
Appellant's product is one that is characterized statutorily as modular housing in that 
it is constructed, assembled or manufactured pursuant to the requirements of the 
Uniform Building Code as adopted by the State of Utah and not according to the 
federal building requirements of Housing and Urban Development for manufactured 
housing. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION: On or about the 8th day 
of December, 1997, the Appellant was charged with contracting without a license 
alleging that on or about the 11th day of November, 1996, the Appellant intentionally 
and knowingly engaged in a construction trade, acting as a contractor in a 
construction trade requiring licensure. In May, 1998, the State amended its 
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information alleging three (3) additional counts for violations occurring on November 
4, 1996, May 8, 1997, and March 30, 1998. See the record as page 61-63. The 
matter was initially set for jury trial but upon the State's motion in limine, filed on or 
about the 22nd day of May, 1998, the matter was set before the trial court to review 
from the standpoint of statutory interpretation. Id at pages 68-71. The jury trial was 
vacated, stipulated facts were submitted to the Court and testimony was received, 
primarily on what members of the Division of Professional Licensing (hereafter 
"Division") and of the private sector understood the statutory language to mean. 
On or about the 3rd day of August, 1998, the trial court filed its Judgment, 
Sentence, Stay of Execution of Sentence, Order of Probation and Certificate of 
Probable Cause, finding the Appellant, LARRY G. BOHNE, guilty of the offense of 
contracting without a license, a class A misdemeanor, sentencing the Appellant per 
statute with a stay of execution of sentence and order of probation ordering that he 
obey all laws, and not engage in the practice of contracting without first obtaining a 
license from the Utah Department of Professional Licensing. Id at page 99; see also 
the Appellant's Addendum B to Appendix attached hereto and incorporated herein 
by this reference. The trial court made findings of fact and conclusions of law as part 
of its certificate of probable cause in support of the its interpretation of the statute. 
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Notice of Appeal was filed on or about the 24th day of August, 1998. The Court of 
Appeals dismissed the appeal on or about the 3rd day of February, 2000, see record 
at page 105, asserting that the decision was not final since three (3) additional 
charges had been stayed involving the same statutory violation. Thereafter, 
charges were dismissed without prejudice, Id at pages 116-117, leaving Count I as 
a final judgment and a new notice of appeal was filed on or about the 21st day of 
April, 2000. Id at pages 125-126. The Court of Appeals filed its decision affirming 
the judgment of the trial court on January 11, 2001. Id at pages 131-134. The 
Appellant filed a petition for Writ of Certiorari for review of the decision of the Court 
of Appeals, on or about the 12,h day of February, 2001. The petition for Writ of 
Certiorari was granted on June 20, 2001. See the record at page 139. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The Appellant, LARRY G. BOHNE, has been in the business of building 
manufactured or modular construction since 1973 (see Trial Transcript at page 126). 
The buildings are assembled at his yard in Cedar City, Utah, and then transported 
on a trailer (see Trial Transcript at page 27) and typically delivered to a general 
contractor or home owner who chooses to get a owner/builder permit as permitted 
by law. See Trial Transcript at 128. Appellant supervises the manufacturing 
process which includes the assembly of floor decking, walls (exterior and interior), 
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the trusses or rafters, the roof decking, the rough electrical wiring, the rough 
plumbing (including sinks, tubs, kitchen appliances, showers and lights), the rough 
mechanical systems, the shingles, the insulation, the sheet rock, the cabinets, the 
painting (exterior and interior), the finishing trim, interior doors, the finishing of 
electrical, plumbing, mechanical equipment and thefinishing exterior siding. Seethe 
record at page 86, paragraph 2. 
2. The modular homes are generally sold assembled as a single unit which 
may include multiple floors requiring installation by a licensed contractor or home 
owner. The Appellant does not do the site work, e.g. excavation, foundation, utilities, 
etc., nor does the Appellant actually install or attach the structure to the foundation. 
The Appellant's product typically has a one (1) year warranty although no such 
warranty is required by statute. Installation of the unit becomes the responsibility of 
the home owner or a licensed contractor. Id. at paragraph 3. 
3. The Appellant's manufacturing process does not utilize subcontractors such 
as electrical or plumbing. However, all units are inspected by a state licensed ICBO 
inspector as provided by statute to insure that all structures meet the requirements 
of the general uniform building codes of construction, electrical, plumbing and 
mechanical. No structure is allowed to leave the plant until all inspections have been 
/// 
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completed and the structure is determined to be in compliance with those general 
building codes. Id. at paragraph 4. 
4. The modular home units are not licensed with the Utah State Division of 
Motor Vehicles nor are they required by statute to be licensed through the Utah State 
Division of Motor Vehicles. Appellant contends that title is typically transferred and 
secured through bills of sale and a UCC-I filing with the Secretary of State. The 
State argues that an Article I filing does not denote ownership but rather a vested 
financial interest. Id. at paragraphs 5 and 6. 
5. On or about the 8th day of December, 1997, the Appellant was charged with 
contracting without a license, alleging that on or about the 11th day of November, 
19916, the Appellant intentionally and knowingly engaged in a construction trade, 
acting as a contractor in a construction trade requiring licensure. See the record at 
pages 1 and 2. 
6. In May, 1998, Respondent amended its information alleging three (3) 
additional counts for violations occurring on November 4,1996, April 8, 1997, and 
March 30,1998. See the record at pages 61-63. The matter was initially set for a 
jury trial but upon the State's motion in limine, filed on or about the 22nd day of May, 
1998, the matter was set before the trial court for review from the standpoint of 
statutory interpretation. See the record at pages 67 and 68. 
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7. The jury trial was vacated, stipulated facts were submitted to the trial court 
and testimony was received, primarily on what members of the Division and of the 
private sector understood the statutory language to mean. See stipulated facts in 
the record at pages 85-87. 
8. On or about the 3rd day of August, 1998, the trial court filed its Judgment, 
Sentence, Stay of Execution of Sentence, Order of Probation and Certificate of 
Probable Cause, finding the Appellant, LARRY G. BOHNE, guilty of the offense of 
contracting without a license, a class A misdemeanor, sentencing him per statute 
with a Stay of Execution of Sentence and Order of Probation ordering that he obey 
all laws, and not engage in the practice of contracting without first obtaining a license 
from the Utah Department of Professional Licensing. See the record at pages 95-99. 
The trial court made findings of fact and conclusions of law as part of its Certificate 
of Probable Cause in support of its interpretation of the statute. Id. The Notice of 
Appeal was filed on the 24th day of August, 1998. See the record at page 101. 
9. On or about the 3rd day of February, 2000, the Court of Appeals issued a 
Memorandum Decision dismissing the appeal because it was not taken from a final 
appealable judgment since there were remaining counts pending in the trial court 
and the Appellant did not timely seek permission from the Court of Appeals to 
Appeal from an Interlocutory Order. 
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10. On or about the 23rd day of March, 2000, the Fifth Judicial District Court 
of Iron County, State of Utah, upon the State's motion, dismissed the remaining 
counts pending against the Appellant and he renewed his appeal on the 21st day of 
April, 2000, of the trial court's final judgment. See the record at pages 116-117. 
11. On the 11* day of January, 2001, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial 
court's decision. See record of pages 131-134; See addendum "C" to the appendix 
attached hereto, and incorporated herein. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The Appellant contends that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the 
trial court's Judgment and Sentence and that such constitutes a departure from the 
ordinary and usual course of judicial proceedings or sanctions such a departure by 
the trial court as to call for the exercise of the Supreme Court's power of supervision. 
The Appellant further asserts that the issues decided by the Court of Appeals 
involved important questions of state law which have not been and should be settled 
by the Supreme Court. Particularly, the Appellant contends that the decision of the 
Court of Appeals interpreting the personal property exemption to exclude builders 
and contractors is not supported by statutory law, the practice within the industry or 
the understanding of the plain meaning of the statutory language for exemption. 
Although the concurring opinion of the Court of Appeals is consistent with the plain 
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meaning of the statutory language, the Appellant contends that it is in error for 
placing the burden proof upon the Appellant to establish qualification for the 
exemption in the context of a criminal offense. 
2. The Appellant contends that the trial court erred in finding him guilty of the 
crime of contracting without a license, a class A misdemeanor in violation of Utah 
Code Annotated § 58-55-301 (1953, as amended), and not exempt from licensing 
under Section 305 of the same Chapter. The Utah Construction Trades Licensing 
Act provides exemption for a person engaged in the sale or merchandising of 
personal property that by its design or manufacture may be attached, installed or 
otherwise affixed to real property who has contracted with a person, firm or 
corporation licensed under the Act to install, affix or attach that property. The Utah 
Uniform Building Standards Act, Chapter 56, Title 58, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
as amended, provides for regulation of a manufactured structure, a "modular unit", 
allowing for inspection to insure that when the structure is for human habitation, 
occupancy or use, that the same complies with the General Uniform Building Codes 
for construction, electrical, plumbing and mechanical. Appellant's construction 
meets all such building code requirements. The Chapter does not expressly require 
the manufacturer to be licensed under the Utah Construction Trades Licensing Act. 
The finding made by the trial court as argued by Respondent attempts to exclude 
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Appellant from the exemption language of Utah Code Annotated § 58-55-305 (6) 
(1953, as amended), by limiting the personal property exemption to a "sears 
exception." The Appellant contends that the trial court's limited and restrictive 
definition of personal property is unreasonable, irrational and in conflict with the 
statute's plain meaning, failing to provide Appellant with reasonable and proper 
notice of criminal misconduct. 
3. The Appellant contends that the trial court erred in its interpretation of Utah 
Code Annotated § 58-55-305 (6) (1953, as amended), by excluding Appellant as 
exempt as a person engaged in the sale or merchandising of personal property and 
therefore subject to the licensing requirement of the construction trades in the State 
of Utah. In reviewing an issue of statutory interpretation with regard to a criminal 
statute, the reviewing court reviews the trial court's interpretation for correctness and 
utilizes the plain meaning of words and phrases used within the statute. No 
particular deference is granted to the trial court's interpretation. The primary 
consideration in construing the statute is to give effect to the legislature's intent in 
which it first looks to the plain language of the statute and only when the statute's 
language is ambiguous will the Court seek guidance from the legislative history and 
policy considerations. The reviewing Court assumes that such terms in the statute 
are used advisedly; thus, the statutory words are read literally, unless such reading 
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is unreasonably confused or inoperable. The Court will not infer substated terms in 
the text that are not already there. The Court will not rewrite the statute to conform 
with an intention not expressed. The Appellant contends that the use of the term 
"personal property" has a clear and well established meaning in the law. The 
Respondent's more restrictive use of the term to only include personal property 
under the "sears exception," is not based on any statutory provision and is 
inconsistent with the Respondent's further rationale that the Appellant's product is 
excluded from exemption because it is not registered with the Department of Motor 
Vehicles and thus, by the Respondent's interpretation of the statute, creates 
ambiguity and confusion in its interpretation. The Appellant argues that if the 
Legislature intended a more restrictive and limited use of the exemption provided 
statutorily, that it would have chosen to use a term other than "personal property," 
to more clearly delineate its intention. 
4. The Appellant contends that the trial court erred in its interpretation of the 
statutory authority for the regulation of constriction trades by including the Appellant, 
an off site modular housing manufacturer, within the same statutory scheme, 
requiring that Appellant be licensed as a contractor in the State of Utah when 
engaged in the fabrication of off site modular housing. While Chapter 55, the 
Construction Trades Licensing Act, provides for the regulation of the construction 
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trades, Chapter 56, the Utah Construction Uniform Building Standards Act, provides 
for the regulatory scheme for modular housing and does not expressly require that 
Appellant be licensed in the construction trades as a contractor. The plain reading 
of the statutory provisions under both chapters is consistent since modular housing 
is "personal property" and therefore fits within the exemption language of section 
305 (6). The exemption language however, requires that such personal property be 
installed or affixed on real property by a licensed contractor. The Respondent's 
limited and restrictive interpretation of "personal property," in addition to creating 
unnecessary ambiguity, expands the division's authority to require that certain 
providers of personal property be licensed as contractors under the Utah 
Construction Trades Act with no clear delineation as to which items of "personal 
property" would be exempt from such licensing requirements. Since such an 
interpretation would have far reaching ramifications within the industry which would 
be inconsistent with the common and universal understanding of personal property 
for those within the industry, the Appellant contends that such an expansion goes 
beyond any budgetary concerns of fiscal responsibility for enforcement. If the 
Legislature intended to adopt such a regulatory scheme, then it would have more 
directly and clearly manifested its expression and not left the matter to be inferred 
by the Division's narrow interpretation of "personal property." 
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ARGUMENT 
The Appellant first considers the issues raised by the Court of Appeals' 
decision in affirming the trial court's judgment which the Appellant believes is a 
departure from the ordinary and usual course of judicial proceedings or sanctions 
such a departure by the trial court to call for an exercise of the Supreme Court's 
power of supervision. Since Appellant believes that the issue is one that has not 
previously been addressed by the Utah Supreme Court for interpretation regarding 
these statutory provisions, the Appellant asserts that the same is one that should be 
settled by the Supreme Court. 
POINT NO. I 
THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS IN ERROR, 
INTERPRETING THE PERSONAL PROPERTY EXEMPTION TO EXCLUDE 
OFF SITE BUILDERS AND CONTRACTORS. 
Section 305 (6), Chapter 55, Title 58, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended, is part of the language found under the Utah Construction Trades 
Licensing Act exempting the requirement of licensing and pertains to those engaged 
in the sale or merchandising of personal property that by its design or manufacture 
may be attached, installed or otherwise affixed to real property who has contracted 
with a person, firm, or corporation licensed under this Chapter to install, affix or 
attach that property. The decision rendered by the Court of Appeals in January, 
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2001, was a split decision with a majority and concurring view. The majority view 
of the decision concludes that the Appellant did not qualify for the exemption since 
he also constructed modular units. In pertinent part the Court of Appeals states: 
Appellant asserts that he is exempt from the Act's licensing 
requirements by virtue of Utah Code Annotated Section 58-55-305(6) 
(1997). However, the licensing exemption in Section 58-55-305(6) 
applies only to "the sale or merchandising of personal property." Id. 
There is no dispute that in addition to selling and merchandising 
modular homes, Appellant also constructs them. No language in 
Section 58-55-305(6) exempts the construction of buildings from the 
licensing requirement.... Appellant's construction of modular homes 
does not fall within the plain meaning of "sale or merchandising"; 
therefore, the licensing exemption in Section 58-55-305(6) does not 
apply. Id. at paragraph 10. (emphasis added) 
This interpretation strongly conflicts with the introductory language found 
within the same Section 305 which reads as follows: 
In addition to the exemptions from licensure in Section 58-55-307, the 
following persons may engage in acts included within the practice of 
construction trades subject to the stated circumstances and limitation 
without being licensed under this Chapter: 
The opinion of Judge Thorne, who concurs in the result, takes issue with the 
majority view. In pertinent part he states: 
By virtue of specific inclusion in the construction trades licensing 
chapter, a person engaged in this "trade" is bound by the licensing 
requirements of the code unless exempted. It makes no sense to 
interpret the exemption provisions in Section 58-55-305(6) as 
exempting only sales persons from the licensing requirements, since 
Section 58-55-301 does not require such persons be licensed in the 
first place. Furthermore, precluding those persons the chapter actually 
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requires to be licensed from using the Section 58-55-305(6) exemption 
flies the face of common sense and renders the statutory exemption 
nugatory. Accordingly, I conclude that being a "contractor/builder" does 
not preclude a person from utilizing the exemption. Id at paragraph 19. 
(emphasis added) 
The opinion of Judge Thome also addresses the issue of whether Appellant's 
modular homes are personal property or real property and points out that the 
question is one avoided by the majority view which relies upon the case of John 
Wagner Assoc, v Hercules. Inc.. at 797 P.2d 1123. (Ut. App. 1990). That case 
deals with modular building construction on site making the case largely 
distinguishable from Appellant's circumstances where construction is entirely off site 
and cannot be considered a fixture even by "force of gravity alone" as may have 
been rightly concluded under the circumstances in the Hercules decision. 
The majority view's reliance upon the Hercules decision is not well reasoned 
since the factual circumstances, while similar in considering modular construction, 
involved construction on site where the question of such property being affixed was 
more the issue in contrast to Appellant's case where construction was entirely off site 
and the assembled units sold while still in the construction yard. Unlike Hercules, 
the "attached by gravity" argument did not change the nature of the property from 
personalty to reality. The majority's view fails to address the issue of personal 
property in the context of the provision's language and its focus upon construction 
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confuses the understanding and application of the exemption and renders 
ambiguous its plain meaning. 
In considering a decision by the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court reviews 
for correctness and give its conclusions of law no deference. Newspaper Agency 
v. Audit Div. Tax Com'n.. 938 P.2d 266 (Utah 1997).This standard of review applies 
also to the conclusions made by the trial court. See Landes v. Capital City Bank.. 
795 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1990). The rules of statutory interpretation mandate the Court 
to look "first to the plain language of the statute... and to assume that each term was 
used advisably by the legislature." See Biddle v. Washington Terrace City. 993 P.2d 
875 (Utah 1999); see also Salt Lake City Corp. v. Salt Lake Civ. Ser.. 908 P.2d 871 
(Ut. App. 1995). The interpretation must be based on the language used, the Court 
has no power to rewrite the statute to conform with an interpretation not expressed. 
Salt Lake City. 908 P.2d at 875. The majority opinion's interpretation of the 
exemption, excluding builders and contractors, confuses the plain meaning of the 
statutory exemption language and constitutes a departure from the ordinary and 
usual course of judicial proceedings or sanctions such a departure by the trial court 
as to call for an exercise of the Supreme Court's power of supervision. 
/// 
/// 
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There has been no decision made by the Utah Supreme Court on this 
important question regarding the scope and application of the personal property 
exemption as it relates to the construction trades and the issue is one hotly 
contested as to its intended meaning. The Appellant believes that while the Court 
of Appeals decision has done little to clarify the ongoing conflict, it has in fact added 
to the confusion by failing to resolve the question of personal property' as it applies 
to off site modular construction or assembly. 
POINT NO. 2 
THE CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE THORNE IS REASONED MORE 
CONSISTENTLY WITH THE PLAIN MEANING OF THE STATUTORY 
LANGUAGE BUT PLACES THE BURDEN OF PROOF UPON THE 
DEFENDANT IN THE CONTEXT OF A CRIMINAL OFFENSE AND 
THEREFORE IS IN ERROR. 
The concurring decision of Judge Thome, regarding the statutory interpretation 
of Section 305 is consistent with that derived from the plain meaning of the 
language. He concludes that Appellant's modular homes, not yet being affixed to 
land, satisfied the personal property prong of the exemption, until they are affixed. 
He points out that to qualify for the exemption further requires that the individual 
contract with a person, firm or corporation licensed to install, affix or attach such 
property. He notes that the stipulated facts presented to the trial court, as well as 
the responses concerning the subject during oral argument, reveal that the question 
Page 21 of 37 
of whether the recipient of Appellant's modular home was licensed under the 
Construction Trades Licensing Act 
were not answered. He concludes by finding that a person claiming statutory 
exemption has the burden of producing sufficient facts to qualify for the exemption. 
On this final point, the Appellant takes exception. 
In the context of the present case, Appellant was convicted of contracting 
without a license, a class A misdemeanor. Utah law is clear on the presumption of 
innocence as a basic component of a fair trial secured by the 14th Amendment of the 
United States Constitution. See State v. Bishop. 753 P.2d 439, 487 (Utah 1988); 
see also Estelle v. Williams. 425 U.S. 501, 503, 96 S. Ct. 1691,1692,48 L Ed.2d 
126 (1976). 
The State has the burden of proof as to every element of the offense and the 
Court is obliged to construe a statute in a way that is consistent with such a 
presumption to avoid constitutional deficiencies. State v. Crediford. 927 P.2d 1129, 
1133 (Wash. 1996). 
The more appropriate determination consistent with Appellant's constitutional 
right of presumption of innocense would have been to find that the State had failed 
to meet its burden of proof and reversed. In the alternative, the Court of Appeals 
could have followed the ordinary and usual course of judicial proceedings and 
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remanded. In Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474 (Ut. App. 1991), the Utah Court 
of Appeals set forth its own standard of review on the matter, stating: 
Unless the record clearly and uncontrovertedly supports the trial court's 
decision, the absence of adequate findings of fact ordinarily requires 
remand for more detailed findings by the trial Court. Id at 472. See 
also State v. Loveqren. 798 P.2d 767, 771 (Ut. App. 1990). 
Where the evidence is unclear in the record as to the existence or 
nonexistence of an element necessary to support the conviction of Appellant on the 
charge of contracting without a license, interpreting existing law in a way to place 
the burden upon the Defendant to produce sufficient facts to qualify for an exemption 
compromises constitutional protection for all perspective defendants and constitutes 
a substantial departure from the ordinary and usual course of judicial proceedings 
or sanctions such a departure by the trial court as to call for an exercise of the 
Supreme Court's power of supervision. 
POINT NO. 3 
THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS SUBSTANTIALLY CHANGES 
THE ACCEPTED UNDERSTANDING OF THE PERSONAL PROPERTY 
EXEMPTION 
WITHIN THE INDUSTRY. 
The Appellant contends that the interpretation of this statutory exemption is 
more than whether a person committed the crime of contracting without a license. 
It has industry wide ramifications. The decision of the Court of Appeals will require 
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those involved at any level of off site construction or fabrication to now be licensed 
as general contractors in the State of Utah. This goes beyond the regulatory scheme 
provided by the Legislature. Chapter 55, regulates the construction trades. Chapter 
56, regulates manufactured and modular housing. The two (2) are separate and 
form the statutory framework for on site and off site construction. There is nothing 
to suggest that those engaged in manufactured or modular housing should also be 
licensed under Chapter 55. No provision of either chapter expressly makes licensing 
a requirement when construction only involves personal property. Those operating 
within the industry have relied upon the personal property exemption to supply off 
site assembled materials often in the form of custom work like cabinets and trusses 
which now will require licensing of the provider. 
The Court of Appeals decision extends the regulatory authority of the Division 
of Professional Licensing into areas where federal law exempts such authority such 
as in the area of HUD homes and virtually eliminates the personal property 
exemption under the statute as predicted by Judge Thorne. Such an interpretation 
exceeds the regulatory authority and budgetary constraints of fiscal responsibility for 
enforcement. 
This expansion of regulatory authority exceeds that mandate which is 
expressly provided by statute. The Utah Uniform Building Standards Act, Utah Code 
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Ann. § 58-56-6 (1953, as amended), delineates the Division's duties and 
responsibilities and Utah Code Ann. § 58-56-15 (1953, as amended), refers 
specifically to the Division's responsibility for factory built housing and modular units. 
Subsection (5) reads as follows: 
The Division... 
(5) May inspect the work of all modular units manufactured in the State 
during the construction process to determine compliance of the 
manufacturer with the Utah Uniform Building Standards Act for those 
units to be installed within the State; and upon finding any substantive 
deficiency issue a corrective order to the manufacturer with a copy to 
the local regulator to the State's political subdivision in which the unit 
is to be installed. 
Appellant contends that if it truly was the Legislature's intent to adopt a 
regulatory scheme to require manufacturers to be licensed as contractors, that the 
same would have been more clearly mandated by its directive and expression of 
duties and authority and not left to be inferred or implied by judicial interpretation of 
the personal property exemption. 
The rationale offered by the Court of Appeals, that of protecting the public, is 
not well taken. Since, the units are purchased before attachment, there is no risk of 
subcontractor liens being filed on the real property of the home owner. The product 
is inspected to be built to code prior to the sale. The legislative purpose of 
protecting the public from "inept and financially irresponsible builders" put forth by 
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the majority view would only apply to improvements made upon the land itself and 
a close reading of the personal property exemption discloses that such protection 
was contemplated in qualifying as Judge Thorne points out. The majority's view 
requires two licensed contractors, one constructing the unit and one installing the 
unit. This substantially changes what has come to be the practice in the industry 
which presently only requires a licensed contractor responsible for installation or 
improvement on site. 
Since the issues before the Utah Supreme Court involve a review of the 
decision made by the Utah Court of Appeals on the basis of a correctness standard, 
the Appellant contends that the issues before the Court of Appeals as presented 
before it for consideration offer some basis for this Court's review and consideration. 
POINT NO. 4 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE 
CRIME OF CONTRACTING WITHOUT A LICENSE, A CLASS A 
MISDEMEANOR, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 58-55-301 
(1953, as amended) AND NOT EXEMPT FROM LICENSING UNDER § 305 
OF THE SAME CHAPTER. 
The licensing requirements for any person engaged in the construction trades are 
found at Utah Code Annotated § 58-55-301 (1953, as amended). In pertinent part 
it states: 
/// 
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(1 )(a) Any person engaged in the construction trades shall 
become licensed under this Chapter before engaging in 
that trade or contracting activity in this state unless 
specifically exempt from licensure under § 58-55-305. 
The exemptions from licensure found at Utah Code Annotated §58-55-305 
(1953, as amended) provide that persons may engage in acts or practices included 
within the construction trades without being licensed and include the following: 
(6) A person engaged in the sale or merchandising of 
personal property that by its design or manufacture may 
be attached, installed, or otherwise affixed to real property 
who has contracted with a person, firm, or corporation 
licensed under this Chapter to install, affix or attach that 
property. 
Home owners are similarly exempt when building structures on their property, 
see subparagraph (4), or constructing or renovating a residential building for non-
commercial, non-public use, see subparagraph (5). 
Chapter 55, which encompasses the Utah Construction Trades Licensing Act 
does not attempt to define or limit the application of personal property. Personal 
property is commonly defined as everything that is the subject of ownership, not 
coming under the denomination of real estate. Real property is generally understood 
to mean land, and whatever is erected or growing upon or affixed to the land. Civil 
law makes the distinction as one of movables and immovables. See Black's Law 
Dictionary. Whether defined under common law or pursuant to civil law, the 
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Appellant's product, a fully assembled residential housing unit built off site, is 
personal property until it is affixed to real estate. This is consistent with the initial 
definition of construction trade found under the general provisions of the Utah 
Construction Trades Licensing Act, Utah Code Annotated § 58-55-102(5) (1953, as 
amended), which reads as follows: 
(5) "Construction trade" means any trade or occupation 
involving construction, alternation, remolding, 
repairing, wreaking or demolition, addition to, or 
improvement of any building, highway, road, 
railroad, dam, bridge, structure, excavation or other 
project, development or improvement to other than 
personal property (emphasis added). 
Chapter 56, encompasses the Utah Uniform Building Standards Act and 
applies to various forms of off site construction including modular construction. Utah 
Code Annotated § 58-56-3(12) (1953, as amended) reads as follows: 
(12) "Modular unit" means a structure built from sections 
which are manufactured in accordance with the 
Construction Standards adopted pursuant to § 58-56-4 
and transported to a building site, the purpose which is for 
human habitation, occupancy, or use. 
Section 4 of the Chapter enumerates that the State adopts the General 
Uniform Building Codes for construction, electrical, plumbing and mechanical. 
Appellant's construction meets all such building code requirements and the units do 
not leave his yard until proper inspection has been made. The trial court in issuing 
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its Certificate of Probable Cause made certain findings and the Appellant asserts 
that the court was in error in finding that Appellant did not sell personal property, that 
by its design or manufacture may be installed on real property. The Court's 
interpretation comes from being persuaded by the State who attempted to explain 
that the personal property exemption of the statute was limited to a certain "sears 
exception" and that Appellant's product did not fit within the "sears exception". See 
record at page 96 and 97. The Appellant asserts that this limited and restrictive 
definition of the statute's use of "personal property" is unreasonable, irrational, in 
conflict with the statute's plain meaning, and fails to provide Appellant with 
reasonable and proper notice of criminal misconduct. 
POINT NO. 5 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETATION OF UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED § 58-55-305(6) (1953, as amended), IN EXCLUDING THE 
APPELLANT FROM EXEMPTION AS A PERSON ENGAGED IN THE SALE OR 
MERCHANDISING OF PERSONAL PROPERTY AND THEREFORE SUBJECT 
TO THE LICENSING REQUIREMENTS IN THE CONSTRUCTION TRADES 
IN THE STATE OF UTAH. 
In State v. Cox, 826 P.2d 656 (Ut App. 1992) the Court of Appeals reviewed 
the issue of statutory interpretation with regard to a criminal statute and set forth 
what is the general rule for review of a trial court's statutory interpretation which is 
that the same is reviewed on a correction of error standard and that a statute should 
be interpreted utilizing the plain meaning of its words. Id. at 662. In State v. 
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Winward. 907 P.2d 1188 (Ut App. 1995), the Court of Appeals stated that 
interpretation of statute is a question of law, granting no particular deference to the 
trial court. Id. at 1190. While the Court of Appeals in that case indicated that the 
primary consideration in construing the statute is to give effect to the legislature's 
intent, the Court set forth a procedure to follow to discern such intent. In that 
instance the Court stated: "To discover [legislative] intent, this Court looks first to the 
plain language of the statute (other citations omitted) only when the statute's 
language is ambiguous will we seek guidance from the legislative history and policy 
considerations." Id; see also World Peace Movement v. Newspaper Agency. 879 
P.2d 253,259 (Utah 1994). In Salt Lake City Corp. v. Salt Lake Civ. Ser.. 908 P.2d 
871 (Ut App. 1995). The Court of Appeals went on to state that it must "assume that 
'each term in the statute was used advisedly; thus the statutory words are read 
literally, unless such reading is unreasonably confused or inoperable," and the 
"Courts are not to infer substated terms into the text that are not already there. 
Rather, the interpretation must be based on the language used, and the Court has 
no power to rewrite the statute to conform to an intention not expressed." Id at 875; 
See also Berrett v. Purser & Edwards, 876 P.2d 367, 370 (Utah 1994). 
/// 
/// 
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The statutory language utilized in the section for exemption from licensure, 
Utah Code Annotated §58-55-305(6) (1953, as amended), clearly utilizes the term 
personal property and does not by any definition attempt to restrict its meaning to 
only include items within the Division's definition of the "Sears exception". 
Moreover, there is no ambiguity in the use of the term as presently written 
under the statute. Respondent attempts to assert that there is some ambiguity 
because the same does not meet within their regulatory scheme. However, 
Appellant asserts that it was never intended for the Division to require those 
engaged in the sale or merchandising of personal property that by 
its design or manufacture may be attached, installed or otherwise affixed to real 
property and who contract with persons, firms or corporations licensed under the 
Chapter for installation to be so regulated. 
More appropriately, Appellant contends that his business comes under the 
regulatory scheme of Chapter 56, the Uniform Building Standards Act, in which he 
is clearly defined as a "modular unit" and subject to the regulatory requirements of 
the Chapter but which noticeably do not expressly require that he be licensed in the 
construction trades as a contractor. Any other interpretation goes beyond the plain 
meaning of the various statutes and by so doing creates ambiguity and confusion in 
its interpretation. 
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In order for the statute in this case to be ambiguous, it must provide different 
meanings to reasonably well informed persons. See Keams-Tribune Corp. v. 
Hornak. 917 P.2d 79 (Ut App. 1996). While testimony was taken in the instant case, 
the representative of the Division that testified, ED L. SHORT, attempted to create 
ambiguity where there was none by asserting that Appellant's product did not qualify 
under the exemption because it was not a structure which is titled by the Utah 
Department of Motor Vehicles. In pertinent part he stated: 
(Jackson) Q: But again that's your interpretation of it 
notwithstanding the personal property exemption? 
(Mr. Short) A: If you read the personal property exemption that I 
think you alluded to earlier when you passed out the 
information, you said where "personal property" is. 
It talks about it, and I think you can read it there out 
of the Rules. 
Q: The Rules you are referring to is in that stack, which 
is Rule 156, is part of the Administrative Rule; is 
that correct? 
A: Yes, sir. 
Q: And they define "personal property"? 
A: Yes, they do. 
Q: "Personal property" to mean as it relates to Title 58, 
56, factory built housing and modular construction, 
a structure which is titled by the Department of 
Motor Vehicles, State of Utah and taxed as personal 
property? 
Page 32 of 37 
A: Right. The modular housing that Mr. BOHNE 
builds, to my knowledge, is not issued a Title 
because it is exempt from titling requirements by 
motor vehicles under 41-1a. 
Q: Well, you are saying that - -
A: It does not, therefore meet that criteria. 
Q: You are saying that the entire interpretation of 
"personal property - -
A: May be flawed. What it basically says is that, if I 
build personal property, whether it be a 
manufactured home, it has to be titled by Motor 
Vehicles. 
Mr. BOHNE's product, to my knowledge, it not titled 
by Motor Vehicles. They exclude it from titling by 
Motor Vehicles. 
Q: So even though he has no legal requirement to title 
the vehicles, you're saying that the only way that 
this property becomes personal property is if he 
goes out and titles it notwithstanding the law that 
exempts him from titling the property? 
A: Yes, sir, because "personal property" says "...and 
titled by Motor Vehicles." 
The Appellant asserts that Mr. SHORT's interpretation of the provision does 
not even conform with the idea that the personal property exemption is only there to 
provide for the "Sears exception," since Sears products such as air conditioners, 
refrigerators, coolers, stoves, sinks, tables, etc., are not licensed with the 
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Department of Motor Vehicles. Mr. SHORT's explanation is not only confusing it is 
nonsensical in its application. If it had been the attempt of the legislature to limit the 
exemption as Mr. SHORT suggests, they could have done so by not using the term 
personal property but some other term such as "sears exception" and then chose to 
define the limits of such term and the use of the exemption. However, the legislature 
chose not to do so and in fact chose to use the term "personal property" as the basis 
for the exemption and then left the terms undefined statutorily for allowance of its 
common usage and understanding to apply. The qualifying portion of the exemption 
comes in the language concerning attachment which must be by one licensed as a 
contractor or who would otherwise qualify for a different exemption. While the 
rationale of Judge Thorne regarding this qualifying point is well taken, the Appellant 
contends that the burden of proof issue is misleading. The evidence before the 
Court is found in the stipulated statement of facts at paragraph 2 of Appellant's Brief 
or paragraph 3 of the stipulated facts in the record at page 86. It states that the units 
are sold to a licensed contractor or home owner, thus, qualifying for the personal 
property exemption of 305(6), or homeowner's exemption of 305(5) noncommercial, 
nonpublic use exemption. In short, a sale of a modular unit, constructed off site to 
/// 
/// 
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either a licensed contractor or a homeowner qualifies for exemption under Section 
305. Judge Thome erred in creating an unnecessary and misleading standard for 
qualification of the exemption. 
In light of all that has been misapplied or misconstrued and the confusing 
basis for interpretation in the context of a criminal case, one point is clear and that 
is that the Appellant was conducting himself in the same way he had in his business 
for nearly thirty (30) years except to discontinue his contractor's license when he no 
longer became involved in setting up the units or excavating the site and it has been 
the Division's enforcement practices that have expanded to attempt to make 
Appellant's long standing business practice now illegal. The consequence of the 
Court of Appeals attempt to uphold this enforcement practice has effectively done 
what Judge Thome predicted in making the personal property exemption nugatory. 
CONCLUSION: 
On the grounds and for the reasons set forth above, Appellant, LARRY G. 
BOHNE, prays that relief be granted by reversing the Court of Appeals decision and 
the Trial Court's Judgment Sentence, Stay of Execution, Order of Probation and 
Certificate of Probably Cause in declaring that the personal property exemption 
language of Subsection 6, Section 305, Chapter 55, Title 58,1953, as amended, be 
interpreted pursuant to its plain and common meaning and not limited to the 
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interpretation rendered but restricted by the Division of Professional Licensing of the 
State of Utah together with such other and further relief as to the Utah Supreme 
Court appears equitable and proper. 
DATED this day of , 20. 
/// 
/// 
/// 
/// 
/// 
/// 
/// 
/// 
/// 
/// 
/// 
/// 
/// 
J. BRYAN JACKSbKl 
Attorney for Appellant Bohne 
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ADDENDUM A 
521 JUDICIAL CODE 78-2-6 
Section 
78-2-1.5, 78-2-1.6. Repealed. 
78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
78-2-3. Repealed. 
78-2-4. Supreme Court — Rulemaking, judges pro tem-
pore, and practice of law. 
78-2-5 Repealed. 
78-2-6. Appellate court administrator. 
78-2-7. Repealed. 
78-2-7.5. Service of sheriff to court. 
78-2-8 to 78-2-14. Repealed. 
78-2-1. Number of jus t ices — Terms — Chief jus t ice 
and associate chief just ice — Select ion and 
functions. 
(1) The Supreme Court consists of five justices. 
(2) A justice of the Supreme Court shall be appointed 
initially to serve until the first general election held more than 
three years after the effective date of the appointment. There-
after, the term of office of a justice of the Supreme Court is ten 
years and commences on the first Mondav in January follow-
ing the date of election. A justice whose term expires may 
serve upon request of the Judicial Council until a successor is 
appointed and qualified. 
(3) The justices of the Supreme Court shall elect a chief 
justice from among the members of the court by a majority 
vote of all justices. The term of the office of chief justice is four 
years. The chief justice may serve successive terms. The chief 
justice may resign from the office of chief justice without 
resigning from the Supreme Court. The chief justice may be 
removed from the office of chief justice by a majority vote of all 
justices of the Supreme Court. 
(4) If the justices are unable to elect a chief justice within 30 
days of a vacancy in that office, the associate chief justice shall 
ait as chief justice until a chief justice is elected under this 
section. If the associate chief justice is unable or unwilling to 
act as chief justice, the most senior justice shall act as chief 
justice until a chief justice is elected under this section. 
(5) In addition to the chief justice's duties as a member of 
the Supreme Court, the chief justice has duties as provided by 
law. 
(6) There is created the office of asset iate chief justice. The 
term of office of the associate chief justice is two years. The 
associate chief justice may serve in that office no more than 
two successive terms. The associate chief justice shall be 
elected by a majority vote of the members of the Supreme 
Court and shall be allocated duties as the chief justice deter-
mines. If the chief justice is absent or otherwise unable to 
serve, the associate chief justice shall serve as chief justice. 
The chief justice may delegate responsibilities to the associate 
diief justice as consistent with law. i«90 
78-2-1.5, 78-2-1.6. Repealed. 1971, IORI 
78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdict ion. 
(1) The Supreme Court has original juiisdiction to answer 
questions of state law certified by a court of the United States. 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all 
extraordinary writs and authority to issue all writs and 
process necessary to carry into effect its orders, judgments, 
and decrees or in'aid of its jurisdiction. 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including 
jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals; 
(b) coses certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of 
Appeals prior to final judgment by the Court of Appeals; 
(c) discipline of lawyers; 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission; 
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative 
proceedings originating with: 
U) the Public Service Commission; 
(ii) the State Tax Commission; 
(iii) the School and Institutional Trust Lands 
Board of Trustees; 
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; 
(v) the state engineer;'or 
(vi) the executive director of the Department of 
Natural Resources reviewing actions of the Division 
of Forestry, Fire and State Lands; 
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review 
of informal adjudicative proceedings of agencies under 
Subsection (e); 
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record 
holding a statute of the United States or this state 
unconstitutional on its face under the Constitution of the 
United States or the Utah Constitution; 
(h) interlocutory appeals from any couit of record in-
volving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction 
of a first degree or capital felony; 
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of 
record over which the Court of Appeals does not have 
original appellate jurisdiction: and 
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments, 
or decrees ruling on legislative subpoenas. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Ap-
peals any of the matters over which the Supreme Court has 
original appellate jurisdiction, except: 
'a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an inter-
locutory order of a court of record involving a charge of a 
capn I felony; 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; 
(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas; and 
(f) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) 
through (d). 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or 
denying a petition for writ of certiorari for the review of a 
Court of Appeals adjudication, but the Supreme Court shall 
review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals under 
Subsection (3)(b). 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the roquiremen' 
of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in its review of agency adjudicative 
proceedings. 1996 
78-2-3. Repealed. 1986 
78-2-4. Supreme Court — Rulemaking, judges pro tem-
pore, and practice of law. 
(1) The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and 
evidence for use in the courts of the state and shall by rule 
manage the appellate process. The Legislature may amend 
the rules of procedure and evidence adopted by the Supreme 
Court upon a vote of two-thirds of all members of both houses 
of the Legislature. 
(2) Except as otherwise provided by the Utah Constitution, 
the Supreme Court by rule may authorize retired justices and 
judges and judges pro tempore to perform any judicial duties. 
Judges pro tempore shall be citizens of the United States, 
Utah residents, and admitted to practice law in Utah. 
(3) The Supreme Court shall by rule govern the practice of 
law, including admission to practice law and the conduct and 
discipline of persons admitted to the practice of law. 1986 
78-2-5. Repealed. 1988 
78-2-6. Appellate court administrator. 
The appellate court administrator shall appoint clerks and 
support staff as necessary for the operation of the Supreme 
Court and the Court of Appeals. The duties of the clerks and 
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(ii) demonstrate his own financial responsibility; 
and 
(iii) pass the required examination and meet all 
other requirements of this chapter, 
(b) A business entity shall: 
(\) suhmit the a$$UcaUoi\ u\ the tuuue of and on 
\>enaYi cfi foe Ws \nes s entily, 
(ii) list the individual as the qualifier; 
(iii) demonstrate financial responsibility of the 
business entity if applying for a contractor's license; 
(iv) provide evidence that the individual qualifier 
has passed the required examination; and 
(v) meet all other requirements of this chapter. 
,j) A person acting as a qualifier for a business entity 
j . ^see must demonstrate to the division that he is an owner, 
-.^r, or manager within that business entity who exercises 
^rial authority in the conduct of that business entity's 
^acting business by: 
(a) making substantive technical and administrative 
decisions relating to the work performed for which a 
license is required under this chapter; 
(b) hiring, promoting, transferring, laying off, disciplin-
ing, directing, or discharging employees of the licensee 
either by himself or through others; and 
(c) not being involved in any other employment or 
activity which conflicts with his duties and responsibili-
ties to ensure the licensee's performance of work regu-
lated under this chapter does not jeopardize the public 
health, safety, and welfare. 
<L\ It is the duty and responsibility of the licensee and the 
'jifier to comply with the provisions of this section. Failure 
**. 
tSP' 
fOmply with the requirements of this section may be 
or both. 
j6) If an individual qualifying on behalf of a business entity 
-tjed a license under this chapter ceases association with 
l^t entity as required in Subsection (4), the licensee shall 
j(jly the division in writing within ten days after cessation of 
^ociation or employment. If notice is given, the license shall 
JJpain in force for 60 days after the date of cessation of 
gelation or employment. The licensee shall replace the 
j^ginal qualifier with another individual qualifier within the 
gCiay period or the license shall be automatically suspended. 
0) Failure to notify the division of cessation of association 
^piployment of a qualifier as required in Subsection (6) may 
^j l t in immediate suspension of the license upon a finding of 
^$5-305. Exempt ions from l i c e n s u r e . 
fj0 addition to the exemptions from licensure in Section 
"1-307, the following persons may engage in acts or prac-
included within the practice of construction trades sub-
to the stated circumstances and limitations without being 
under this chapter: 
(1) an authorized representative of the United States 
government or an authorized employee of the state or any 
of its political subdivisions when working on construction 
work of the state or the subdivision, and when acting 
within the terms of his trust , office, or employment; 
dental to the construction and repair of irrigation and 
drainage ditches of regularly constituted irrigation dis-
tricts, reclamation districts, and drainage districts or 
Construction and repair relating to farming, dairying, 
Igriculture, livestock or poultry raising, metal and coal 
mining, quarries, sand and gravel excavations, well drill-
ing, hauling to and from construction sites, and lumber-
ing; 
(3) public utilities operating under the rules of the 
Public Service Commission on construction work inciden-
|al to their own business; 
(4) sole owners of property engaged in building: 
(a) no more than two residential structures per 
year on their property for their own noncommercial, 
nonpublic use that the owner lives in for at least 
three months; except, any /person other than the 
property owner or individuals described in Subsec-
tion (5) who engages in building the structure must 
be licensed under this chapter if he is otherwise 
required to be licensed under this chapter; or 
(b) structures on their property for their own non-
commercial, nonpublic use which are incidental to a 
residential structure on the property, including 
sheds, carports, or detached garages; 
(5) (a) an individual engaged in construction or reno-
vation of a residential building for noncommercial, 
nonpublic use if that person: 
(i) works without compensation other than 
token compensation that is not considered salary 
or wages; and 
(ii) works under the direction of the property 
owner who engages in building the structure; 
(b) for purposes of Subsection (5), "token compen-
sation" means compensation paid by a sole owner of 
property exempted from licensure under Subsection 
(4) to an individual exempted from licensure under 
Subsection (5), that is: 
(i) minimal in value when compared with the 
fair market value of the services provided by the 
individual; 
(ii) not related to the fair market value of the 
services provided by the individual; and 
individual including paying for or providing 
meals or refreshment while services are being 
provided, or paying reasonable transportation 
costs incurred by the individual in travel to the 
site of construction; 
(6) a person engaged in the sale or merchandising of 
personal property that by its design or manufacture may 
\)C attached, installed, or otherwise affixed to real prop-
erty who has contracted with a person, firm, or corpora-
tion licensed under this chapter to install, affix, or attach 
that property; 
(7) a contractor submitting a bid on a federal aid 
jiighway project, if, before undertaking any construction 
^nder that bid, the contractor is licensed under this 
chapter; 
(8) (a) a person engaged in the alteration, repair, re-
modeling, or addition to or improvement of any build-
ing with a contracted or agreed value of less than 
$1,000, including both labor and materials, and in-
cluding all changes or additions to the contracted or 
agreed upon work; 
(b) notwithstanding Subsection (8)(a), work in the 
plumbing and electrical trades must be performed by 
a licensed electrician or plumber except as otherwise 
provided in this section; 
tion or construction trade which is not classified by i ule by 
the director as significantly impacting the public's health, 
safety, and welfare; 
(10) owners and lessees of property and persons regu-
larly employed for wages by owners or lessees of property 
or their agents for the purpose of maintaining the prop-
erty, are exempt from this chapter when doing work upon 
the property; 
(11) (a) a person engaged in minor plumbing work 
incidental to the replacement or repair of a fixture or 
an appliance in a residential or small commercial 
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(iii) one member shall be from the public at large 
with no history of involvement in the construction 
trades or union affiliation. 
(2) The boards shall be appointed and serve in accordance 
with Section 58-1-201. 
(3\ Tl\o, duties &*vd re&^v&&v.lvt\ft& QC U\a boatds skall he. uv 
accordance with Sections 58-1-202 and 58-1-203. 2000 
PART 3 
LICENSING 
58-55-301. L i cense required — License classif ications. 
(1) (a) Any person engaged in the construction trades li-
censed under this chapter, as a contractor regulated 
under this chapter, as an alarm business or company, or 
as an alarm company agent, shall become licensed under 
this chapter before engaging in that trade or contracting 
activity in this state unless specifically exempted from 
licensure under Section 58-1-307 or 58-55-305. 
(b) The license issued under this chapter and the 
business license issued by the local jurisdiction in which 
the licensee has its principal place of business shall be the 
only licenses required for the licensee to engage in a trade 
licensed by this chapter, within the state. 
(c) Neither the state nor any of its political subdivisions 
may require of a licensee any additional business licenses, 
registrations, certifications, contributions, donations, or 
anything else established for the purpose of qualifying a 
licensee under this chapter to do business in that local 
jurisdiction, except for contract prequalification proce-
dures required by state a^eueies^ or the payment
 Qf any 
Too f>r the license, registration, or certification estab-
lished as a condition to do business in that local jurisdic-
tion. 
(2) The division shall issue licenses under this chapter to 
qualified persons in the following classifications: 
(a) general engineering contractor; 
(b) general building contractor; 
(c) residential and small commercial contractor; 
(d) specialty contractor; 
(e) journeyman plumber; 
(f) apprentice plumber; 
(g) residential journeyman plumber; 
(h) residential apprentice plumber; 
(i) master electrician; 
(j) residential master electrician; 
(k) journeyman electrician; 
(1) residential journeyman electrician; 
(m) apprentice electrician; 
(n) construction trades instructor: 
(i) general engineering classification; 
(ii) general building classification; 
(iii) electrical classification; 
(iv) plumbing classification; and 
(v) mechanical classification; 
(o) alarm company; and 
(p) alarm company agent. 
V )^ h n appYicant may app\y SOT a Yicense in one or moTe 
classification or specialty contractor subclassification. A li-
cense shall be granted in each classification or subclassifica-
tion for which the applicant qualifies. A separate application 
and fee must be submitted for each license classification or 
subclassification. 2000 
58-55-302. Qua l i f i ca t ions for l icensure. 
(1) Each applicant for a license under this chapter shall: 
(a) submit an application prescribed by the division; 
(b) pay a fee as determined by the department under 
Section 63-38-3.2; 
(c) (i) meet the examination requirements established 
by rule by the division in collaboration with the 
appropriate board, except for the classifications of 
apprentice plumber, residential apprentice plumber, 
and apprentice electrician for whom no examination 
is required; or ' 
(ii) the individual qualifier must pass the required 
examination if the applicant is a business entity; 
(d) if an apprentice, identify the proposed supervisor of 
the apprenticeship; 
(e) if an applicant for a contractor's license: 
(i) produce satisfactory evidence of financial re-
sponsibility, except for construction trades instructor 
for whom evidence of financial responsibility is not 
required; 
(ii) produce satisfactory evidence of knowledge and 
experience in the construction industry and knowl-
edge of the principles of the conduct of business as a 
contractor, reasonably necessary for the protection of 
the public health, safety, and welfare; and 
(iii) be a licensed master electrician if an applicant 
for an electrical contractor's license or a licensed 
master residential electrician if an applicant for a 
residential electrical contractor's license; or 
(iv) be a journeyman plumber or residential jour-
neyman plumber if an applicant for a plumbing 
contractor's license; and 
(f) if an applicant for a construction trades instructor 
license, satisfy any additional requirements established 
by rule. 
(2) After approval of an applicant for a contractor's license 
following with the division before the division issues the 
license: 
(a) proof of workers' compensation insurance which 
covers employees of the applicant in accordance with 
applicable Utah law; 
(b) proof of public liability insurance in coverage 
amounts and form established by rule except for a con-
struction trades instructor for whom public liability in-
surance is not required; and 
(c) proof of registration as required by applicable law 
with the: 
(i) Utah Department of Commerce; 
(ii) Division of Corporations and Commercial 
Code; 
(iii) Division of Workforce Information and Pay-
ment Services in the Department of Workforce Ser-
vices, for purposes of Title 35A, Chapter 4, Employ-
ment Security Act; 
(iv) State Tax Commission; and 
(v) Internal Revenue Service. 
(3) In addition to the general requirements for each appli-
cant in Subsection (1), applicants shall comply with the 
following requirements to be licensed in the following classi-
fications: 
(a) A journeyman plumber applicant shall produce: 
the equivalent of at least four years of full-time 
training and instruction as a licensed apprentice 
plumber under supervision of a licensed journeyman 
plumber and in accordance with a planned program 
of training approved by the division; 
(ii) satisfactory evidence of at least eight years of 
full-time experience approved by the division in col-
laboration with the Plumbers Licensing Board; or 
(iii) satisfactory evidence of meeting the qualifica-
tions determined by the division nr 1 board to be 
equivalent to Subsection (3)(a)(i) or (a;Ui). 
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Section 
58-56-5. Building Code Commission — Composition of 
commission — Commission duties and re-
sponsibilities. 
58-5G-6. Building codes — Division duties and respon-
sibilities. 
58-56-7. Code amendments — Commission recommen-
dations — Division duties and responsibili-
ties. 
58-56-8. Compliance with codes — Responsibility for 
inspections — Appeals. 
58-56-8.5. Building Inspector Licensing Board. 
58-56-9. Qualifications of inspectors <— Contract for 
inspection services. 
58-56-10. Repealed. 
58-56-11. Standards for specialized buildings. 
58-56-12. Factory built housing units. 
58-56-13. Modular units. 
58-56-14. Modification of factory built housing units and 
modular units. 
58-56-15. Factory built housing and modular units — 
Division responsibility. 
58-56-16. Registration of dealers — Bonding require-
ments — Renewal — Exemptions — Disci-
pline. 
58-56-17. Fees on sale — Escrow agents — Sales tax. 
58-56-17.5. Factory Built Housing Fees Restricted Ac-
count. 
58-56-18. Repealed. 
58-56-1. Short title. 
This chapter is known as the "Utah Unifqrm Building 
Standards Act." 1989 
58-56-2. Chapter administrat ion. 
The provisions of this chapter shall be administered by the 
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing. 1989 
58-56-3. Definitions. 
In addition to the definitions in Section 58-1-102, as used in 
this chapter: 
(1) uANSlM means American National Standards Insti-
tute, Inc. 
(2) "Codo(sT means the NEC, building code, mechani-
cal code, or plumbing code as defined in this section and as 
applied in context. 
(3) "Commission"' means the Uniform Building Code 
Commission created under this chapter. 
(4) "Compliance agency" means an agency of the state 
or any of its political subdivisions which issue permits for 
construction regulated under the codes, or any other 
agency of the state or its political subdivisions specifically 
empowered to enforce compliance with the codes. 
(5) "Factory built housing" means manufactured homes 
or mobile homes. 
(6) "Factory built housing set-up contractor" means an 
individual licensed by the division to set up or install 
factory built housing on a temporary or permanent basis. 
The scope of the work included under the license includes 
the placement and or securing of the factory built housing 
on a permanent or temporary foundation, securing the 
units together if required, and connection of the utilities 
to the factory built housing unit, but does not include site 
preparation, construction of a permanent foundation, and 
construction of utility services to the near proximity of the 
factory built housing unit. If a dealer is not licenced as a 
factory built housing set up contractor, that individual 
must subcontract the connection services to individuals 
who are licensed by the division to perform those specific 
functions under Title 58, Chapter 55, Utah Construction 
Trades Licensing Act. 
(7) "HUD code" means the Fedeial Manufactured 
Housing Construction and Safety Standards Act. 
(8) "Installation standard" means the standard 
adopted and published by the National Conference of 
States on Building Codes and Standards (NCSBCS), for 
the installation of manufactured homes titled "The Stan-
dard for fJanufactured Home Installations," the accompa-
nying manufacturer's instructions for the installation of 
the manufactured home, or such equivalent standard as 
adopted by rule. 
(9) "Local regulator" means earn political subdivision 
of the state which is empowered to engage in the regula-
tion of construction, alteration, remodeling, building, re-
pair, and other activities subject to the codes adopted 
pursuant to this chapter. 
(10) "Manufactured home" means a transportable fac-
tory built housing unit constructed on or afUr June 15, 
1976, according to the Federal Home Construction and 
Safety Standards Act of 1974 (HUD Code), in erne or more 
sections, which, in the traveling mode, is eight body feet 
or more in width or 40 body feet or more in length, or 
when erected on site, is 400 or more square feet, and 
which is built on a permanent chassis and designed to be 
used as a dwelling with or without a permanent founda-
tion when connected to the required utilities, and includes 
the plumbing, heating, air-conditioning, and electrical 
systems. All manufactured homes constructed on or after 
June 15, 1976, shall be identifiable by the manufacturer's 
data plate bearing the date the unit was manufactured 
and a HUD label attached to the exterior of the home 
certifying the home was manufactured to HUD standards. 
(11) "Mobile home" means a transportable factory built 
housing unit built prior to June 15, 1976, in accordance 
with a state mobile home code which existed prior to the 
Federal Manufactured Housing and Safety Standaids Act 
(HUD Code). 
(12) "Modular unit" means a structure built from sec-
tions which are manufactured in accordance with the 
construction standards adopted pursuant to Section 58-
56-4 and transported to a building site, the purpose of 
which is for human habitation, occupancy, or use. 
(13) "NEC" means the National Electrical Code 
(14) "Opinion" means a written, nonbinding, and advi-
sory statement issued by the commission concerning an 
interpretation of the meaning of the codes or the applica-
tion of the codes in a specific circumstance issued in 
response to a specific request by a party to the issue. 
(15) "State regulator" means an agency of the state 
which is empowered to engage in the regulation of con-
struction, alteration, remodeling, building, repair, and 
other activities subject to the codes adopted pursuant to 
this chapter. 
(16) "Unlawful conduct" is as defined in Subsection 
58-1-501(1) and includes: 
(a) engaging in the sale of factory built housing 
without being registered with the division as a dealer, 
unless the sale is exempt under Section 58-56-16; and 
(b) selling factory built housing within the state as 
a dealer without collecting and remitting to the 
division the fee required by Section 58-56-17. 
(17) "Unprofessional conduct" is as defined in Subsec-
tion 58-1-501(2) and includes: 
(a) any nondelivery of goods or services by a regis-
tered dealer which constitutes a breach of contract by 
the dealer; 
(b) the failure of a registered dealer to pay a 
subcontractor or supplier any amounts to which that 
subcontractor or supplier is legally entitled; and 
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CHAPTER 55 
CONSTRUCTION TRADES LICENSING 
Section 
58-55-1 to 58-55-21. Renumbered as §§ 58-55-101 to 58-55-
604. 
Part 1 
General Provis ions 
58 55-101. 
53 55-102. 
58-55-201. 
Short title. 
Definitions. 
Part 2 
Board 
Board created — Duties. 
Part 3 
Licensing 
58-55-301. License required — License classifications. 
58 55-302. Qualifications for licensure. 
58-55-303. Term of license — Expiration — Renewal. 
58-55-304. Licensee names — License number use — 
License qualifier. 
58-55-305. Exemptions from licensure. 
58-55-306. Financial responsibility. 
58 55-307. Confidentiality of records and reports. 
58 55-308 Scope of practice — Rules. 
58-55-309. Repealed. 
M-55-310. Requirements when working for political sub-
division or state agency. 
58-55-311 Evidence of licensure. 
58-55-312. Interim permits. 
Part 4 
L icense Denial and Discipl ine 
58-55-401 Grounds for denial of license and disciplinary 
proceedings. 
5^-55-402. Investigation of regulated activity. 
58-55-403. Minimum time for division action. 
Part 5 
Unlawful and Unprofessional Conduct — Penal t ies 
58*55-501. Unlawful conduct. 
58-55-502. Unprofessional conduct. 
58-55-503. Penalty for unlawful conduct — Citations 
Part 6 
Payment Provis ions 
58-55-601. Payment — Account designated. 
58-55-602 Payment of construction funds — Interest. 
58-55-603. Payment to subcontractors and suppliers. 
58-55-604. Proof of licensure to maintain or commence 
action. 
58-55-1 to 58-55-21. 
55-604. 
Renumbered as §§ 58-55-101 to 58-
1994 
P A R T I 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
5845-101. S h o r t t itle. 
This chapter is known as the "Utah Construction Trades 
Licensing Act." 1994 
58-55-102. Def in i t ions . 
In addition to the definitions in Section 58-1-102, as used in 
this chapter: 
(1) (a) "Alarm business or company" means a person 
engaged in the sale, installation, piaintenance, alter-
ation, repair, replacement, servicing, or monitoring of 
an alarm system. 
(b) ."Alarm business or company" does not include 
the activities of: 
(i) a person engaged in the manufacture and 
sale of alarm systems when that person is not 
engaged in the installation, maintenance, alter-
ation, repair, replacement, servicing, or monitor-
ing of alarm systems, and the manufacture or 
sale occurs only at a place of business established 
by the person engaged in the manufacture or sale 
and does not involve site visits at the place or 
intended place of installation of an alarm system; 
Or 
(ii) an owner of an alarm system, or an em-
ployee of the owner of an alarm system who is 
engaged in installation, maintenance, alteration, 
repair, replacement, servicing, or monitoring of 
the alarm system owned by that owner. 
(2) "Alarm company agent" means any individual em-
ployed within this state by a person engaged in the alarm 
business. 
(3) "Alarm system" means equipment and devices as-
sembled for the purpose of: 
(a) detecting and signaling unauthorized intrusion 
or entry into or onto certain premises; or 
(b) signaling a robbery or attempted robbery on 
protected premises. 
(4) "Apprentice electrician" means a person licensed 
under this chapter as an apprentice electrician who is 
learning the electrical trade under approved supervision 
of a master electrician, residential master electrician, a 
journeyman electrician, or a residential journeyman elec-
trician. 
(5) "Apprentice plumber" means a person licensed un-
der this chapter as an apprentice plumber who is learning 
the plumbing trade under approved supervision of a 
journeyman plumber. 
(6) "Approved supervision" means the immediate su-
pervision of apprentices by qualified licensed electricians 
or plumbers as a part of a planned program of training. 
(7) "Board" means the Contractors Licensing Board, 
Electrician Licensing Board, Alarm System Security and 
Licensing Board, or Plumbers Licensing Board created in 
Section 58-55-201. 
, (8) "Construction trade" means any trade or occupation 
involving construction, alteration, remodeling, repairing, 
wrecking or demolition, addition to, or improvement of 
any building, highway, road, railroad, dam, bridge, struc-
ture, excavation or other project, development, or im-
provement to other than personal property. 
(9) "Construction trades instructor" means a person 
licensed under this chapter to teach one or more construc-
tion trades in both a classroom and project environment, 
where a project is intended for sale to or use by the public 
and is completed under the direction of an instructor who 
has no economic interest in the project. 
(10) (a) "Contractor" means any person who for com-
pensation other than wages as an employee under-
takes any work in the construction, plumbing, or 
electrical trade for which licensure is required under 
this chapter and includes: 
(i) a person who builds any structure on his 
own property for the purpose of sale or who 
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Code amendments — Commission recommen-
dations — Division duties and responsibili-
ties 
Compliance with codes — Responsibility for 
inspections — Appeals. 
Building Inspector Licensing Board. 
Qualifications of inspectors -— Contract for 
inspection services. 
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Standards for specialized buildings. 
Factory built housing units. 
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Division responsibility. 
Registration of dealers — Bonding require-
ments — Renewal — Exemptions — Disci-
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Factory Built Housing Fees Restricted Ac-
count 
Repealed. 
58-5G-1. S h o r t t i t le . 
This chapter is known as the "Utah Uniform Building 
Standards Act." 1989 
58-56-2. C h a p t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . 
The provisions of this chapter shall be administered by the 
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing. 1989 
58-56-3. Def in i t ions . 
In addition to the definitions in Section 58-1-102, as used in 
this chapter: 
(1) "ANSI" means American National Standards Insti-
tute, Inc. 
(2) "Code(s)" means the NEC, building code, mechani-
cal code, or plumbing code as defined in this section and as 
applied in context. 
(3) "Commission" means the Uniform Building Code 
Commission created under this chapter. 
(4) "Compliance agency" means an agency of the state 
or any of its political subdivisions which issue permits for 
construction regulated under the codes, or any other 
agency of the state or its political subdivisions specifically 
empowered to enforce compliance with the codes. 
(5) "Factory built housing" means manufactured homes 
or mobile homes. 
(6) "Factory built housing set-up contractor" means an 
individual licensed by the division to set up or install 
factory built housing on a temporary or permanent basis. 
The scope of the work included under the license includes 
the placement and or securing of the factory built housing 
on a permanent or temporary foundation, securing the 
units together if required, and connection of the utilities 
to the factory built housing unit, but does not include site 
preparation, construction of a permanent foundation, and 
construction of utility services to the near proximity of the 
factory built housing unit. If a dealer is not licensed as a 
factory built housing set up contractor, that individual 
must subcontract the connection services to individuals 
who are licensed by the division to perform those specific 
functions under Title 58, Chapter 55, Utah Construction 
Trades Licensing Act. 
(7) "HUD code" means the Federal Manufactured 
Housing Construction and Safety Standards Act. 
(8) "Installation standard" means the standard 
adopted and published by the National Conference of 
States on Building Codes and Standards (NCSBCS), for 
the installation of manufactured homes titled "The Stan-
dard for Manufactured Home Installations," the accompa-
nying manufacturer's instructions for the installation of 
the manufactured home, or such equivalent standard as 
adopted by rule., 
(9) "Local regulator" means each political subdivision 
of the state which is empowered to engage in the regula-
tion of construction, alteration, remodeling, building, re-
pair, and other activities subject to the codes adopted 
pursuant to thi<* chapter. 
(10) "Manufactured home" means a transportable fac-
tory built housing unit constructed on or after June 15, 
1976, according to the Federal Home Construction and 
Safety Standards Act of 1974 (HUD Code), in one1 or more 
sections, which, in the traveling mode, is eight body feet 
or more in width or 40 body feet or more in length, or 
when erected on site, is 400 or more square feet, and 
which is built on a permanent chassis and designed to be 
used as a dwelling with or without a permanent founda-
tion when connected to the required utilities, and includes 
the plumbing, heating, air-conditioning, and electrical 
systems. All manufactured homes constructed on or after 
June 15, 1976, shall be identifiable by the manufacturer's 
data plate bearing the date the unit was manufactured 
and a HUD label attached to the exterior of the home 
certifying the home was manufactured to HUD standards. 
(11) "Mobile home" means a transportable factory built 
housing unit built prior to June 15, 1976, in accordance 
with a state mobile home code which existed prior to the 
Federal Manufactured Housing and Safety Standards Act 
(HUD Code). 
(12) "Modular unit" means a structure built from sec-
tions which are manufactured in accordance with the 
construction standards adopted pursuant to Section 58-
56-4 and transported to a building site, the purpose of 
which is for human habitation, occupancy, or use. 
(13) "NEC" means the National Electrical Code. 
(14) "Opinion" means a written, nonbinding, and advi-
sory statement issued by the commission concerning an 
interpretation of the meaning of the codes or the applica-
tion of the codes in a specific circumstance issued in 
response to a specific request by a party to the issue. 
(15) "State regulator" means an agency of the state 
which is empowered to engage in the regulation of con*, 
struction, alteration, remodeling, building, repair, and 
other activities subject to the codes adopted pursuant to 
this chapter. 
(16) "Unlawful conduct" is as defined in Subsection 
58-1-501(1) and includes: 
(a) engaging in the sale of factory built housing 
without being registered with the division as a dealer, 
unless the sale is exempt under Section 58-56-16; and 
(b) selling factory built housing within the state as 
a dealer without collecting and remitting to the 
division the fee required by Section 58-56-17. 
(17) "Unprofessional conduct" is as defined in Subsec-
tion 58-1-501(2) and includes: 
(a) any nondelivery of goods or services by a regis-
tered dealer which constitutes a breach of contract by 
the dealer; 
(b) the failure of a registered dealer to pay a 
subcontractor or supplier any amounts to which that 
subcontractor or supplier is legally entitled; and 
281 OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS 58-56-5 
(c) any other activity whirh is defined as unprofes-
sional conduct by division rule in accordance wi*h the 
provisions of Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administra-
tive Rulemaking Act. 2000 
58-56-4. Definitions — Adoption of bui lding codes — 
Amendments — Exemptions . 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "agricultural use" means a use that relates to the 
tilling of soil and raising of crops, or keeping or raising 
domestic animals, for the purpose of commercial food 
production; 
(b) "not for human occupancy" means use of a structure 
for purposes other than protection or comfort of human 
beings, but allows people to enter the structure for: 
(i) maintenance and repair; and 
(ii) the care of livestock, crops, or equipment in-
tended for agricultural use which are kept there; and 
(c) "residential area" means land that is not used for an 
agricultural use and is: 
(i) (A) within the boundaries of a city or town; and 
(B) less than five contiguous acres; 
(ii) (A) within a subdivision for which the county 
has approved a subdivision plat under Title 17, 
Chapter 27, Part 8, Subdivision; and 
(B) less than two contiguous acres; or 
(iii) not located in whole or in pai t in an agricul-
tural protection area created under Title 17, Chapter 
41, Agricultural Protection Area. 
(2) Subject to the provisions of Subsections (4) and (5), the 
following are adopted as the construction standards to which 
the state and each political subdivision of this state shall 
adhere in building construction, alteration, remodeling and 
repair, and in the regulation of building construction, alter-
ation, remodeling and repair: 
(a) a building code promulgated by a nationally recog-
nized code authority; 
(b) the National Electrical Code promulgated by the 
National Fire Protection Association; 
(c) a plumbing code adopted by a nationally recognized 
code authority; and 
(d) a mechanical code promulgated by a nationally 
recognized code authority. 
(3) The division, in collaboration with the commission, shall 
adopt by rule the edition of the NEC or code and specific 
edition of the codes described in Subsections (2)(a), (c), and (d) 
to be used as the standard and may adopt by rule successor 
editions of any adopted code. 
(4) The division, in collaboration with the commission, may 
adopt amendments to the adopted codes to be applicable to the 
entire state or within a political subdivision only in accordance 
with Section 58-56-7. 
(5) (a) Except in a residential area, a structure used solely 
in conjunction with agriculture use, and not for human 
occupancy, is exempted from the permit requirements of 
any building code adopted by the division. 
(b) Notwithstanding Subsection (5)(a), unless other-
wise exempted, plumbing, electrical, and mechanical per-
mits may be required when that work is included in the 
structure. 1998 
58-56-5. Building Code Commission — Composition of 
commission — Commission duties and re-
sponsibilities. 
(1) There is established a Uniform Building Code Commis-
lion to advise the division with respect to the division's 
responsibilities in administering the codes under this chapter. 
(2) The commission shall be appointed by the executive 
director who shall submit his nominations to the governor for 
confirmation or rejection. If a nominee is rejected, alternative 
names shall be submitted until confirmation is received. 
Following confirmation by the governor, the appointment shall 
be made. 
(3) The commission shall consist of eleven members who 
shall be appointed in accordance with the following: 
(a) one member shall be from among candidates nomi-
nated by the Utah League of Cities and Towns and the 
Utah Association of Counties; 
(b) one member shall be a licensed building inspector 
employed by a political subdivision of the state; 
(c) one member shall be a licensed professional engi-
neer; 
(d) one member shall be a licensed architect; 
(e) one member shall be a fire official; 
(f) three members shall be contractors licensed by the 
state, of which one shall be a general contractor, one an 
electrical contractor, and one a plumbing contractor; 
(g) two members shall be from the (general public and 
have no affiliation with the construction industry or real 
estate development industry; and 
(h) one member shall be from the Division of Facilities 
Construction Management, Department of Administra-
tive Services. 
(4) (a) Except as required by Subsection (4)(h), as terms of 
current commission members expire, the executive direc-
tor shall appoint each new member or reappointed mem-
ber to a four-year term. 
(b) Notwithstanding the requirements of Subsection 
(4)(a), the executive director shall, at the time of appoint-
ment or reappointment, adjust the length of terms to 
ensuie that the terms of commission members are stag-
gered so that approximately half of the commission is 
appointed every two years. 
(5) When a vacancy occurs in the membership for any 
reason, the replacement shall be appointed for the unexpired 
term. 
(6) No commission member may serve more than two full 
terms, and no commission member who ceases to serve may 
again serve on the commission until after the expiration of two 
years from the date of cessation of service. 
(7) A majotity of the commission members shall constitute 
a quorum and may act on behalf of the commission. 
(8) (a) (i) Members who are not government employees 
shall receive no compensation or benefits for their 
services, but may receive per diem and expenses 
incurred in the performance of the member's official 
duties at the rates established by the Division of 
Finance under Sections 63A-3-106 and 63A-3-107. 
(ii) Members may decline to receive per diem and 
expenses for their service. 
(b) (i) State government officer and employee members 
who do not receive salary, per diem, or expenses from 
their agency for their service may receive per diem 
and expenses incurred in the performance of their 
official duties from the commission at the rates estab-
lished by the Division of Finance under Sections 
63A-3-106 and 63A-3-107. 
(ii) State government officer and employee mem-
bers may decline to receive per diem and expenses for 
their service. 
(c) (i) Local government members who do not receive 
salary, per diem, or expenses from the entity that 
they represent for their service may receive per diem 
and expenses incurred in the performance of their 
official duties at the rates established by the Division 
of Finance under Sections 63A-3-106 and 63A-3-107. 
(ii) Local government members may decline to 
receive per diem and expenses for their service. 
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(9) The commission shall annually designate one of its 
members to serve as chair of the commission. The division 
shall provide a secretary to facilitate the function of the 
commission and to record its actions and recommendations. 
(10) The duties and responsibilities of the commission are 
to: 
(a) recommend to the director the adoption by rule of 
the edition of the NEC, and the specific codes and editions 
of the codes described in Subsections 58-56-4(2)(a), (c) and 
(d) adopted pursuant to this chapter; 
(b) recommend to the director the adoption by rule of 
amendments to the NEC, the building code, the mechani-
cal code, and plumbing code adopted pursuant to this 
chapter; 
(c) offer an opinion regarding the interpretation of or 
the application of any of the codes adopted pursuant to 
this chapter upon a formal submission by a party to the 
matter in question which submission must clearly state 
the facts in question, the specific code citation involved 
and the position taken by all parties; 
(d) act as an appeals board as provided in Subsection 
58-56-8(3); 
(e) establish advisory peer committees on either a 
standing or ad hoc basis to advise the commission with 
respect to building code matters, including a committee to 
advise the commission regarding health matters related 
to the UFC; and 
(f) assist the division in overseeing code related train-
ing in accordance with Section 58-56-9. 1998 
58-56-6. Bui ld ing codes — Divis ion dut ies and respon-
sibil it ies. 
(1) The division shall administer the adoption and amend-
ment of the NEC, the building code, the mechanical code, and 
the plumbing code adopted under Section 58-5(J-/t pursuant to 
this chapter; but, shall have no responsibility or duty to 
conduct inspections to determine compliance with the codes, 
issue permits, or assess building permit fees. 
(2) Administration of the NEC, the building code, the 
mechanical code, and the plumbing code adopted under Sec-
tion 58-56-4 by the division shall include: 
(a) receiving recommendations from the commission 
and thereafter adopting by rule the editions of the codes 
and amendments to the codes; 
(b) maintaining and publishing for reference on a cur-
rent basis the editions of the code in force and amend-
ments thereto; and 
(c) receiving requests for amendments and opinions 
from the commission, scheduling appropriate hearings 
and publishing the amendments to the codes and the 
opinions of the commission with respect to interpretation 
and application of the codes. 1995 
58-56-7. Code amendments — Commiss ion recommen-
dat ions — Divis ion dut ies and responsibil i -
t ies . 
(1) The division, with the commission, shall establish by 
rule the procedure and manner under which requests for 
amendments to codes shall be: 
(a) filed with the division; and 
(b) recommended or declined for adoption. 
(2) The division shall accept from any local regulators, state 
regulators, state agencies involved with the construction and 
design of buildings, the contractors, plumbers, or electricians 
licensing boards, or from recognized construction-related as-
sociations a request for amendment to the NEC, the building 
code, the mechanical code, or the plumbing code adopted 
under Section 58-56-4. 
(3) The division or the commission on its own initiative may 
make recommendations to the commission for amendment to 
the NEC, the building code, the mechanical code, or the 
plumbing code adopted under Section 58-56-4. 
(4) On May 15 and November 15 of each calendar year, or 
the first government working day thereafter if cither date falls 
on a weekend or government holiday, the division shall con-
vene a public hearing, as a part of the rulemaking process, 
before the commission concerning requests for amendment of 
the codes, recommended by the division and comniission to be 
adopted by rule. The hearing shall be conducted in accordance 
with the rules of the commission. 
(5) Within 15 days following completion of the hearing 
under Subsection (4) or (5), the commission shall provide to 
the division a written recommendation concerning each 
amendment. 
(6) The division shall consider the recommendations and 
promulgate amendments by rule in accordance w,ith Title 63, 
Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act and as 
prescribed by the director. 
(7) The decision of the division to accept or reject the 
recommendation of the commission shall be made within 15 
days after receipt of the recommendation. 
(8) All decisions of the division pertaining to adoption of a 
code edition or amendments to any code, which are contrary to 
recommendations of the commission, may be overridden by a 
two-thirds vote of the commission according to a procedure to 
be established by rule. 
(9) (a) Amendments with statewide application: 
(i) shall be effective on the January 1 or July 1 
immediately following the public hearing; or 
(ii) may be effective prior to the dates in Subsec-
tion (i) if designated by the division and, the commis-
sion as necessary for the public health, safety, and 
welfare. 
(b) Amendments with local application only shall be 
effective on a date to be determined by the division and 
the commission. 
(c) In making rules required by this chapter, the divi-
sion shall comply with the provisions of Title 63, Chapter 
46a, Administrative Rulemaking Act, the provisions of 
that chapter shall have control over this section in case of 
any conflict. 1998 
58-56-8. Compliance wi th codes — Responsibi l i ty for 
inspect ions — Appeals. 
(1) The responsibility for inspection of construction projects 
and enforcement of compliance with provisions of the codes 
shall be with the compliance agency having jurisdiction over 
the project and the applicable codes. 
(2) A finding by a compliance agency that a [licensed con-
tractor, electrician, or plumber pas materially violated the 
provisions of a code in a manner to jeopardise the public 
health, safety, and welfare and failed to comply with corrective 
orders of the compliance agency shall be furnished in writing 
to the division by the compliance agency. It is the responsibil-
ity of the compliance agency to conduct a primary investiga-
tion to determine that, in fact, there has been a material 
violation of the provisions of the code jeopardizing the public 
interest and provide the report of investigation to the division. 
(3) Each compliance agency shall establishj a method of 
appeal by which a person disputing the application and 
interpretation of a code may appeal and receive a timely 
review of the disputed issues in accordance with provisions of 
the National Electrical Code, the building code, the mechani-
cal code, or the plumbing code adopted under Section 58-56-4. 
If a compliance agency refuses to establish a method of appeal, 
the commission shall act as the appeals board and conduct a 
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58-56-14, Modif ica t ion of fac tory bu i l t h o u s i n g u n i t s 
a n d m o d u l a r u n i t s . 
(1) Any modification to factory built housing units shall be 
made in accordance with the following: 
(a) Prior to set-up, modification to a manufactured 
home or mobile home prior to installation or set-up of the 
unit for na6i'£a£ion shad be made in accordance with the 
HUD code. 
(b) After set-up: 
(i) modification to a manufactured home or mobile 
home after installation or set-up of the unit for 
habitation, which modification does not include the 
addition of any space to the existing unit or the 
at tachment of any structure to the existing unit shall 
be made in accordance with the HUD code; and 
(ii) modification to a manufactured home or mobile 
home after installation or set-up of the unit for 
habitation, which modification includes the addition 
of any space to the existing unit or the at tachment of 
any structure to the unit shall be made as follows: 
(A) modifications to the existing unit shall be 
in accordance with the HUD code; and 
(B) additional structure outside of the existing 
unit shall be in accordance with the Utah Uni-
form Building Standards Act. 
(2) Any modification to modular housing units shall be 
made in accordance with the Utah Uniform Building Stan-
dards Act. 1990 
58-56-15. F a c t o r y bu i l t h o u s i n g a n d m o d u l a r u n i t s — 
Divis ion respons ib i l i ty . 
Ths division: 
(1) shall maintain current files with respect to the 
HUD code and amendments thereto with respect to 
nianufactured homes and the "installation standard" de-
fined in Section 58-56-3 with respect to installation of 
factory built housing; and will provide at reasonable cost 
such information to all compliance agencies, local regula-
tors, or state regulators requesting such information; 
(2) shall provide qualified personnel to advise compli-
ance agencies, local regulators, and state regulators re-
garding the standards for construction and set-up, con-
struction and set-up inspection, and additions or 
inodifications to factory built housing; 
(3) may regularly inspect the work of all factory built 
housing manufacturers in the state during the construc-
tion process to determine compliance of the manufacturer 
with the applicable standards of the HUD code or the 
American National Standards Institute, Inc. or equiva-
lent standards adopted by rule; and upon a finding of any 
substantive deficiency furnish a written finding of such 
deficiency to the standards agency; 
(4) is hereby designated as the state administrative 
agency and shall act as such for all purposes under the 
provisions of the HUD code; and 
(5) may inspect the work of all modular unit manufac-
turers in the state during the construction process to 
determine compliance of the manufacturer with the Utah 
Uniform Building Standard Act for those units to be 
installed within the state; and upon a finding of any 
substantive deficiency issue a corrective order to the 
rrianufacturer with a copy to the local regulator in the 
state's political subdivision in which the unit is to be 
installed. 1990 
58-56-16. R e g i s t r a t i o n of d e a l e r s — B o n d i n g r e q u i r e -
m e n t s — R e n e w a l — E x e m p t i o n s — Disci-
p l ine . 
(1) Each person engaged in the sale of factory built housing 
in the state, except as provided in Subsection (4), shall register 
with the division as a dealer. 
(2) Each applicant for registration under this section shall: 
(a) submit an application in a form prescribed by the 
division; 
(b) pay a fee determined by the department under 
Section 63-38-3.2; and 
(c) provide the division with *a registration bond in 
Accordance with ru/es established by the division. 
(3) (a) .The division shall iss^ie each registration under this 
Section in accordance with a two-year renewal cycle 
established by rule. 
(b) The division may by rule extend or shorten a 
renewal c^cle by as much as one year to stagger the 
renewal cycles it administers. 
(c) Each registration under this section automatically 
expires on the expiration date on the certificate of regis-
tration unless the registrant renews it in accordance with 
Section 58-1-308. 
(4) Subsection (1) does not apply to: 
(a) a person not regularly engaged in thej sale of factory 
built housing who is selling a unit he owns for his own 
account; 
(b) a principal broker licensed under Title 61, Chapter 
2, Division of Real Estate; or 
(c) a sales agent or associate broker licensed under 
Title 61, Chapter 2, Division of Real Estate, who sells 
factory built housing as an agent for, and under the 
supervision, of the licensed principal broker with whom 
he is affiliated. 
(5) Grounds for refusing to issue a registration, for refusing 
to renew a registration, for revoking, suspending, restricting, 
or placing on probation a registration, for issuing a public or 
private reprimand to a registrant, and for issuing a cease and 
desist order shall be in accordance with Section 58-1-401. 
1999 
58-56-17. F e e s o n sa le — E s c r o w a g e n t s — Sa les tax. 
O) Each dealer shall collect and remit a fee of $75 to the 
division for each factory built home the dealer* sells that has 
not b^ cMi permanently affixed to real property. The fee shall be 
payable within 30 days following the close of each calendar 
quarter for all units sold during that calendar quarter. The fee 
shall be deposited in a restricted account as provided in 
Section 58-56-17.5. 
(2) Any principal real estate broker, associate broker, or 
sales agent exempt from registration as a dealer under Section 
58-56-16 who sells a factory built home tha t has not been 
permanently affixed to real property shall close the sale only 
through a qualified escrow agent in this state registered with 
the Insurance Department or the Department of Financial 
Institutions. 
(3) Each escrow agent through which a sale is closed under 
Subsection (2) shall remit all required sales tax to the state. 
1999 
58-5G-17.5. F a c t o r y Bu i l t H o u s i n g F e e s R e s t r i c t e d Ac-
c o u n t . 
(1) There is created within the General Fund a restricted 
account known as "Factory Built Housing Fees Account." 
(2) (a) The restricted account shall be funded from the fees 
the dealer collects and remits to the division for each 
factory built home the dealer sells as provided in Subsec-
tion 58-56-17(1). 
(b) The division shall deposit all monies collected under 
Subsection 58-56-17(1) in the restricted account. 
(c) The restricted account shall be used to pay for 
education and enforcement of the Uniform Building Stan-
dards Act, including investigations and administrative 
actions and the funding of additional employees to the 
amount of the legislative appropriation. 
(d) The restricted account may accrue interest which 
shall be deposited into the restricted account. 1997 
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ADDENDUM B 
DAVID R. BRICKEY (#6188) 
Chief Deputy Iron County Attorney 
97 North Main, Suite #1 
P.O. Box 428 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Telephone: (801)586-6694 
Telecopier: (801)586-2737 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LARRY G. BOHNE, 
Defendant. 
) JUDGMENT, SENTENCE, STAY 
OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE, 
) ORDER OF PROBATION AND 
CERTIFICATE OF PROBABLE CAUSE 
) 
) Criminal No. 971501320 
) Judge Robert T. Braithwaite 
The above-entitled matter having come before the Court for a previously scheduled criminal 
trial, and the State of Utah having appeared by and through Chief Deputy Iron County Attorney 
David R. Brickey, and the Defendant LARRY G. BOHNE, appearing in person together with his 
attorney of record, Bryan Jackson, and the Court thereafter hearing testimony both on June 16,1998, 
and on June 24, 1998, and the Court thereafter entering an opinion that the Defendant was in fact 
guilty, the Court thereafter ordering the County Attorney's Office to prepare a Judgement, Sentence, 
Stay of Execution of Sentence, Order of Probation, and a Certificate of Probable Cause. 
JUDGEMENT 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendant, LARRY 
G. BOHNE, having been found guilty to the offense of CONTRACTING WITHOUT A LICENSE, 
a Class A Misdemeanor, and the Court having asked whether the Defendant had anything to say in 
regard to why judgment should not be pronounced, and no sufficient cause to the contrary being 
shown or appearing to the Court, it is adjudged that the Defendant is guilty as charged arid convicted. 
SENTENCE 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant, LARRY G. BOHNE, and pursuant to his 
conviction of CONTRACTING WITHOUT A LICENSE, a Class A Misdemeanor, is hereby 
sentenced to a term of incarceration in the Iron County Correctional Facility for a period of six (6) 
months, and the Defendant is hereby placed in the custody of the Iron County Correctional 
Facility/Iron County Sheriff. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDER that the Defendant, LARRY G. BOHNE, and pursuant to his 
conviction of CONTRACTING WITHOUT A LICENSE, a Class A Misdemeanor, pay a fine in the 
sum and amount of one-thousand dollars ($1,000). 
STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the execution of the term of imprisonment imposed and the 
fine imposed in this case are hereby stayed, pending the Defendant's strict adherence to and 
compliance with the following terms and conditions of probation. 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendant, LARRY 
G. BOHNE, is hereby placed on bench probation for a period of twelve (12) months, under the 
supervision of the Fifth District Court, strictly within the following terms, provisions, and 
conditions: 
1. That the Defendant is oidered to obey all laws and terms and conditions of this 
probation for the following twelve (12) months. 
2. That the Defendant is further ordered to not engage in the practice of contracting 
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without obtaining first a license from the Utah Department of Professional Licensing. 
CERTIFICATE OF PROBABLE CAUSE 
The Court having heard argument from both the Defendant and the Stale of Utah, hereby 
enters the following findings of fact as pertinent and relevant to the Court of Appeals in determining 
that this is appropriate for certification of probable cause pursuant to Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, Rule 27. The substantial questions of law and fact are as follows to wit: 
1. The Court adopts the factual findings and stipulations agreed to by counsel for the 
State of Utah and the Defendant. By this reference the Court incorporates them into this order. 
2. The Court finds that the home built by the defendant is a modular structure under 58-
56-312, Utah Code Annotated. It was constructed at one location and transported to another location 
for attachment to a foundation. It is not a manufactured home under subsection 9, because it is not 
HUD certified. It is not a mobile home because it did not have wheels or chassis. 
3. Section 58-55-301(a) UCA, requires persons engaged in the construction trade to be 
licensed. The defendant by stipulation, did not have a license. The court determines that the 
defendant's activities brought him under the requirements of this statute. 
4. The Court finds that the defendant engaged in the trade of general building contractor, 
and residential small commercial contractor under section 58-55-301 (b)(2)(c) UCA. His activities 
constituted those of a general contractor: overseeing the construction of the component parts of the 
home that was transported, either doing the work himself, or lining up subcontractors to do work 
such as the electrical or plumbing. The foundation structure was done by someone else, but the 
home that was put on the structure was done by the defendant. 
5. The Court finds that the defendant does not meet the exceptions of 58-55-305(6) 
UCA. Specifically, the court finds that the defendant did not sell personal property, that by its 
-3-
design or manufacture may be installed on leal property. He sold a basically completed home fiom 
the ground up, which then was attached to a foundation. The defendant did not just provide 
materials, he fabricated or combined them into a completed product. Additionally, the court is 
persuaded by the testimony presented by the state that this does not meet the "Sears exception" of 
personal property such as an air conditioner. A more reasonable interpretation of the statute^hat it 
is intended for personal property such as an air conditioner. To rule otherwise would allow the 
exception to swallow the rule. Each general contractor and subcontractor could claim that they were 
selling personal property, individual components such as pipe or electrical wire, etc., that ended up 
being attached to the property. 
6. The court believes that the statutes imply a legislative public policy that homes be 
built by a general contractor license by the Department of Professional Licensing. The court 
recognizes there are exemptions, such as homeowner built homes, etc. but that the defendant does 
not fit recognized exemption. 
7. The court heard from experts from both sides of the case with exact opposite opinions 
of the requirements applying to the defendant and the facts in this case. While the court adopts a 
position consistent with the Department of Commerce and the current state officials regarding the 
statutes the court finds that this matter is appropriate for certification of probable cause pursuant to 
the requirements of Rule 27 Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
i (7 
ftroval as to Form: 
B'4Y#N JA(&SON 
Attorney for Defendant 
-4-
d 
DATED this _9_ day of July, 1998. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
Mu7' 'IU. 
ROBERT T. BRA.ITHWAITE 
District Court Judge 
TIFICATE 
COUNTY OF IRON ) 
I, CAROLYN BULLOCH, Clerk of the Fifth Judicial District Court in and for Iron County, 
State of Utah, hereby certify that the foregoing is a full, true and exact copy of the original Judgment, 
Sentence, Stay of Execution of Sentence, Order of Probation and Certificate of Probable Cause in 
the case entitled State of Utah vs. Larry G. Bohne. Criminal No. 971501320, now on file and of 
record in my office. 
WITNESS my hand and the seal of said office in Cedar City, County of Iron, State of Utah, 
this 3^ day of Wty, 1998. 
( S E A L ) 
CAROLYN BULLQHH 
AROLYN BULLOCH 
strict Court Clerk 
i\ijyr- Ub'KiY 
eputy District Court Clerk 
-5-
00& •J 
ADDENDUM C 
FILED 
This opinion is subject to revision before U l a h C o u r t o f A p p 8 a , a 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. JAN 1 1 2001 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS Paulette Stagg 
Cleric of the Court 
ooOoo 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Larry G. Bohne, 
Defendant and Appellant 
OPINION 
(For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20000350-CA 
F I L E D 
(January 11, 2001) 
[2001 UT App 11 
Fifth District, Cedar City Department 
The Honorable Robert T. Braithwaite 
Attorneys: J. Bryan Jackson, Cedar City, for Appellant 
Mark L. Shurtleff and J. Frederic Voros, Jr., Salt 
Lake City, and Scott Burns, Cedar City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Bench, Davis, and Thorne. 
BENCH, Judge: 
Kl Appellant Larry G. Bohne appeals from a conviction of 
contracting without a license, a class A misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-501 (1997) . We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
^2 Appellant builds and sells modular homes. Appellant is not 
a licensed contractor, and does not use licensed subcontractors, 
such as electricians or plumbers, in constructing the modular 
homes. The modular homes are inspected, however, by a state-
licensed inspector to insure compliance with the general uniform 
building codes. 
%3 Appellant generally sells the modular homes assembled as a 
single unit, and transports them from his manufacturing facility 
to installation sites by using a "low-boy" trailer. Appellant 
never performs any site work, such as excavation, laying a 
foundation, or installing utilities, nor does he actually install 
or attach the modular buildings to a foundation. The buyers of 
the homes bear all responsibility for site work and installation 
of the modular buildings. 
H4 On December 9, 1991, the State of Utah filed an Information 
against Appellant alleging multiple counts of contracting without 
a license, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-55-501 (1997) . Following a bench trial on one count, the 
trial court entered a judgment of guilty, sentenced Appellant to 
a six-month term of incarceration, and imposed a one-thousand 
dollar fine. The trial court stayed execution of the sentence 
and placed Appellant on twelve months bench probation, which 
prohibited Appellant from constructing modular homes without 
first obtaining a license from the Utah Department of 
Professional Licensing. This appeal followed. 
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
H5 First, we must determine whether the Construction Trades 
Licensing Act (Act) requires Appellant to obtain a license and 
whether Appellant qualifies for a licensing exemption under the 
Act. Second, we must determine whether Appellant's compliance 
with the Uniform Building Standards Act excuses any noncompliance 
with the Construction Trades Licensing Act. The issues involve 
statutory interpretation, which we review for correctness. See 
State v. Fixel, 945 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
ANALYSIS 
^6 We begin our analysis by determining whether the 
Construction Trades Licensing Act requires Appellant to obtain a 
license prior to constructing off-site modular homes. The Act 
requires: 
Any person engaged in the construction trades 
licensed under this chapter, or as a 
contractor regulated under this chapter, 
shall become licensed under this chapter 
before engaging in that trade or contracting 
activity in this state unless specifically 
exempted from licensure under Section 58-55-
305. 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-301 (1) (a) (1997). Appellant asserts that 
his manufacturing of modular homes is not a construction trade, 
and thus he is not required to be licensed under the Act. The 
term "construction trade" is defined by the Act as follows: 
"Construction trade" means any trade or 
occupation involving construction, 
alteration, remodeling, repairing, wrecking 
or demolition, addition to, or improvement of 
any building, highway, road, railroad, dam, 
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bridge, structure, excavation or other 
project, development, or improvement to other 
than personal property. 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-102(5) (1997). 
H7 In construing these statutes, we follow the rules of 
statutory construction: 
A fundamental rule of statutory construction 
is that statutes are to be construed 
according to their plain language. Only if 
the language of a statute is ambiguous do we 
resort to other modes of construction. 
Furthermore, unambiguous language may not be 
interpreted to contradict its plain meaning. 
A corollary of this rule is that "a statutory 
term should be interpreted and applied 
according to its usually accepted meaning, 
where the ordinary meaning of the term 
results in an application that is neither 
unreasonably confused, inoperable, nor in 
blatant contradiction of the express purpose 
of the statute." 
O'Keefe v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 956 P.2d 279, 281 (Utah 
1998) (citations omitted). We find the language of section 58-
55-102(5) to be unambiguous. Thus, we rely only upon the plain 
meaning of thg.. statutory language, and do not resort to any other 
mode of constriction. 
|^8 The relevant section of the Act provides that the phrase 
1,1
 [c] onstruction trade1 means any trade or occupation involving 
construction . . . of any building." Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-
102(5) (1997). Although determining what constitutes a building 
is a question of degree, to conclude that the modular home at 
issue is not a building would contradict the plain meaning of the 
word. See John Wagner Assocs. v. Hercules, Inc., 797 P.2d 1123, 
1128 (Utah-Ct. App. 1990). The modular unit is a completed home 
meant for human occupancy. Specifically, it comes complete with 
the following: assembled floor decking, exterior and interior 
walls, trusses, roof decking, rough electrical wiring, rough 
plumbing (including sinks, bathtubs, showers, and kitchen 
appliances), rough mechanical systems, shingles, insulation, 
sheet rock, cabinets, interior and exterior painting, interior 
doors, finishing electrical, finishing plumbing, finishing 
mechanical equipment, and finishing exterior siding. 
1|9 In tact, Appellant concedes that he constructs buildings, 
and this concession is consistent with case law. In Hercules, we 
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held that the plain meaning of the word "building," as Used in 
Utah's Payment Bond Statute, includes modular of fice^ complexes. 
See id. at 1128-29. We follow Hercules to the extent that the 
plain meaning of the word "building," as used in the Actr 
includes the modular home at issue in this oase. See id. at 
1128-29. We conclude that because Appellant constructs 
buildings, he is involved in a "construction trade" and must be 
licensed under the Act. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-55-102(5), 
-301(1) (a) (1997) . 
HlO Appellant next argues the trial court erred in not finding 
him exempt from the licensing requirement of the Act. See id. 
Specifically, Appellant asserts that he is exempt from the Act's 
licensing requirement by virtue of Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-305(6) 
(1997). However, the licensing exemption in section 58-55-305(6) 
applies only to "the sale or merchandising of personal property." 
Id. There is no dispute that in addition to selling and 
merchandising modular homes, Appellant also constructs them. No 
language in section 58-55-305(6) exempts the construction of 
buildings from the licensing requirement. See id. Our reading 
of section 58-55-305(6) is in harmony with Utah Code Ann. § 58-
55-305(4) (1997), which clearly provides a limited licensing 
exemption for property owners' personal construction of 
noncommercial, personal-use buildings. Appellant's construction 
of modular homes does not fall within the plain meaning of "sale 
or merchandising"; therefore, the licensing exemption in section 
58-55-305(6) does not apply. 
1|ll Finally, Appellant contends that his compliance with the 
Uniform Building Standards Act excuses any noncompliance with the 
Construction Trades Licensing Act. We disagree. The legislative 
purposes for enacting the Construction Trades Licensing Act and 
the Uniform Building Standards Act are complementary. The 
legislative purpose for the Construction Trades Licensing Act is 
to protect the public from "inept and financially irresponsible 
builders." American Rural Cellular v. Systems Comm. Corp., 890 
P.2d 1035, 1040 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). The legislative purpose 
for the Uniform Building Standards Act is to "ensure decent 
housing." Wade v. Jobe, 818 P.2d 1006, 1010 (Utah 1991). Both 
acts protect the public, but while one act deals with the 
provider, the other act deals with the product. The Construction 
Trades Licensing Act also covers financial responsibility of 
builders--an area of protection not covered by the Uniform 
Building Standards Act. 
1)12 Both acts therefore work together in protecting the public. 
Just because a contractor is licensed under the Construction 
Trades Licensing Act, the contractor's work is not exempt from 
compliance with the applicable building codes. The same logic 
applies in reverse. Compliance with the applicable building 
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codes is required but does not exempt noncompliance with the 
Construction Trades Licensing Act. Thus/ -we conclude that a 
modular home builder must comply with both' the Construction 
Trades Licensing Act and the Uniform Building Standards Afct. 
CONCLUSION 
ll3 Appellant's construction of modular homes constitutes a 
construction trade that requires him to be licensed. Appellant 
does not qualify for an exemption from the licensing requirement, 
Appellant's compliance with the Uniform Building Standards Act 
does not excuse his noncompliance with the Construction Trades 
Licensing Act. 
Hl4 Accordingly, we affirm, 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
JaweK Z. Davis^ATudge 
THORNE, Judge (concurring in result): 
Hl6 I respectfully disagree with the reasoning relied upon by my 
colleagues. I do, however, concur in the result. My 
disagreement is based upon the following: (1) I do not believe 
that by virtue of constructing the modular home in question, 
defendant is precluded from relying upon the licensing exemption 
found in Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-305(6) (1997); and (2) I believe 
the modular homes constructed by defendant are personal property 
until affixed to real property, and thus may qualify as exempt 
under section 58-55-305(6). As such, in my view, defendant 
satisfies the first two requirements of section 58-55-305(6). 
Nevertheless, I would affirm defendant's conviction because he 
failed to show that he sold the modular home in question to a 
licensed contractor for installation. 
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1)17 I agree that, absent an exemption,1 defendant must comply 
with the construction trade licensing requirements contained in 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-301(1) (a) (1997), when he sells modular 
homes. I believe section 58-55-305 is just such an exemption. 
In pertinent part, section 58-55-305(6) provides that the 
construction trade licensing requirements do not apply to 
a person engaged in the sale or merchandising 
of personal property that by its design or 
manufacture may be attached, installed, or 
otherwise affixed to real property who has 
contracted with a person, firm, or 
corporation licensed under this chapter to 
install, affix or attach that property. 
Id. at § 58-55-305(6) (emphasis added). 
^18 Based on the language of section 58-55-305(6), the majority 
concludes 
the licensing exemption in section 58-55-
305(6) applies only to "the sale or 
merchandising of personal property." . . . 
There is no dispute that in addition to 
selling and merchandising modular homes, 
[defendant] also constructs them. No 
language in section 58-55-305(6) exempts the 
construction of buildings from the licensing 
requirements. 
(Emphasis in original.) 
[^19 The rules of statutory interpretation mandate that we look 
"first to the plain language of the statute . . . and to assume [] 
that each term was used advisedly by the [L] egislature. " Biddle 
v. Washington Terrace City, 1999 UT 110,^14, 993 P.2d 875. By 
virtue of specific inclusion in the construction trades licensing 
chapter, persons engaged in these "trades" are bound by the 
licensing requirements of the code unless exempted. It makes no 
sense to interpret the exemption provision in section 58-55-
305(6) as exempting only salespersons from the licensing 
requirements, when section 58-55-301 does not require such 
persons be licensed in the first place. Furthermoie, precluding 
1. Section'58-55-301(1) (a) , in relevant part, provides that 
"[a]ny person engaged in the construction trades . . . shall 
become licensed . . . unless specifically exempted from licensure 
under Section 58-55-305." Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-301 (1) (a) 
(1997) . 
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those persons the chapter actually requires to be licensed from 
using the section 58-55-305(6) exemption flies in the face of 
common sense and renders the statutory exemption nugatory. 
Accordingly, I would conclude that being a "constructor/builder" 
does not preclude a person from utilizing the exemption. 
^20 To benefit from the exemption defendant's modular homes 
must first qualify as personal property. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-55-305(6) (stating "a person engaged in the sale or 
merchandising of personal property"). Accordingly, we must 
decide whether defendant's modular homes are personal property or 
real property. The majority opinion, I believe, fails to 
adequately resolve this question. 
1|21 The majority relies upon John Wagner Assocs. v. Hercules, 
Inc., 797 P.2d 1123, 1127-30 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), concluding 
that 
In Hercules, we held that the plain meaning 
of the word "building," as used in Utah's 
Payment Bond Statute, includes modular office 
complexes. . . . We follow Hercules to the 
extent that the plain meaning of the word 
"building," as used in [Utah Code Ann. § 58-
55-301 (a)], includes the modular home at 
issue in this case. 
Indeed, in Hercules, we stated that "'[w]hat is a building must 
always be a question of degree; but ordinarily the word refers to 
a structure enclosing a space within walls and roof.'" Hercules, 
797 P.2d at 1128 (quoting 12 C.J.S. Building (1980)). 
^22 Clearly, the modular home at issue here is a building. 
However, the issue in Hercules was whether modular buildings 
constructed on-site and secured to the land by gravity 
constituted realty. There, we addressed this issue, stating 
"' [i]t is settled . . . that a building need not be physically 
anchored to the land to be considered realty. It may be found to 
be a fixture though it is secured to the realty by force of 
gravity alone.'" Id. (quoting Rinaldi v. Goller, 309 P.2d 451, 
453 (Cal. 1953)). Obviously, Hercules is distinguishable, 
because here defendant's modular home has neither been 
transported to its site nor has it been attached, anchored by 
gravity, or otherwise affixed to the land. 
1|23 Furtnermorfe-K both .case law and legal treatises have 
uniformly identified modular homes as personal property because 
thesjle^units are "'movable at the time of identification to the 
contract'for sale' akd hence are 'goods.'" Burnham v. Mark IV 
Hope's, Inc.1:}441 N.EJpd 1027, 1031 (Mass. 1982) (quoting Fuqua 
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Homes, Inc. v. Evanston Bldg. & Loan Co., 370 N.E.2d 780 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 1977)); see, e.g., Little v. Grizzly Mfg., 636 P.2d 839, 
842 (Mont. 1981) (citing and agreeing with Stephenson v. Frazier, 
399 N.E.2d 794 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) and Cates v. Morgan Portable 
Bldg. Corp., 591 F.2d 17 (7th Cir. 1979) that modular homes are 
goods); see also 67 Am. Jur. 2d Sales § 61 (1999) ("Prefabricated 
modular homes are also "goods" when movable at time of 
identification to the contract for sale. When a modular home is 
already situated on the lot at the time of sale the transaction 
is one in real estate . . . ." (Citations omitted.)); Black's 
Law Dictionary 1218 (6th ed. 1990) (defining real property as 
11
 [1] and, and generally whatever is erected or growing upon or 
affixed to land"). 
H24 In the present matter, defendant's modular home was not yet 
affixed to land, and hence, was movable, making it "goods" or 
personal property. See Burnham, 441 N.E.2d at 1031. 
Accordingly, defendant's building satisfies the "personal 
property" prong of section 58-55-305(6), until such time as it is 
"affixed." 
1125 Finally, to qualify for the section 58-55-305(6) exemption, 
defendant is required to "contract [] with a person, firm, or 
corporation licensed under this chapter to install, affix, or 
attach that property." Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-305(6) (1997). My 
review of the parties' stipulated facts, which were presented to 
the trial court, as well as their responses concerning this 
subject during oral argument, reveal that the question of whether 
the recipient of defendant's modular home was licensed under 
section 55-58-301 was not answered. 
1126 A person claiming a statutory exemption has the burden of 
producing sufficient facts to qualify for the exemption. See 
Parson Asphalt Prods., Inc. v. Utah State Tax Coram'n, 617 P.2d 
397, 398 (Utah 1980) (stating "statutes which provide for 
exemptions should be strictly construed and one who so claims has 
the burden of showing his entitlement to the exemption" 
(footnotes omitted)). Had the record revealed that defendant had 
transferred the personal property to a licensed individual, firm, 
or company, as required by section 58-55-305(6), I would vacate 
the conviction. But, in light of the absence of sufficient facts 
demonstrating that defendant contracted to sell the modular home 
to a licensed person or firm, I concur in the majority's result. 
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